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 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT
Davor PetriÊ*
Abstract: The paper discusses the concept of ‘environmental justice’ 
in the European Union, approaching it from the perspective of the cen-
tre-periphery gap in the EU, that is, the divide between the Member 
States from Western and Northern Europe on the one hand and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe on the other. It identifi es distributive, proce-
dural and corrective injustices that make the EU periphery, albeit less 
responsible for historical and contemporary environmental harms in 
Europe, bear the greater environmental burden, in addition to hav-
ing less infl uence over environmental decision-making than the EU 
centre. The discussion is informed by the ideas that have emerged 
in US scholarship, especially regarding the concept of environmental 
justice itself, as well as the critical analysis of the (re)distributive ef-
fects of law and the identity critique of law. The paper concludes with 
a refl ection on possible avenues for integrating environmental justice 
concerns into the EU legal and institutional framework in order to bet-
ter address the centre-periphery gap and mitigate existing regional 
inequalities in environmental matters.
Keywords: environmental justice, European Union, centre-periphery 
gap, distributive injustice, procedural injustice, corrective injustice.
1 Some introductory remarks
Here is a question that may not ring a bell at fi rst for a random Eu-
ropean legal scholar: What is environmental justice? Of those who might 
know a thing or two about environmental law, my estimate is that nine 
out of ten would mention something regarding the Aarhus Convention, an 
international environmental treaty that regulates, among other things, 
access to courts (more on this later in the paper); hence, environmental 
justice. On the other hand, the term in the sense taken here would be 
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much more familiar to a US legal scholar. Such a scholar would probably 
come up with different defi nitions capturing the same or a similar idea 
which can be found in US academic and policy works.
So, I will also start with a defi nition, but, for the purposes of this pa-
per, by defi ning the negation of environmental justice, or, in other words, 
environmental injustice. To my mind, this is a situation where a societal 
group which is the least responsible for environmental harms bears the 
greatest burden in dealing or living with those harms, at the same time 
having the least political clout or infl uence in decision-making on envi-
ronmental matters.
In this sense, a couple of dimensions of environmental (in)justice 
become apparent: (i) distributive ones, which look at the distribution of 
resources (‘goods’ and ‘bads’, ie benefi ts and burdens), be it political, 
economic or environmental; (ii) procedural ones, which examine the in-
stitutional voice and access to decision-making; and (iii) corrective ones, 
which observe access to legal remedies to address environmental harms. 
Having these three dimensions as a conceptual framework, I will focus 
on the European Union (EU) and ask whether any kind of environmental 
injustice occurs in its legal and political system.
Before this, a word on the background to this question: what are the 
ideas that I will be working with?
First, environmental justice itself. The idea and concept come from 
the USA. There, it has attracted substantial attention in activist, aca-
demic and political circles from the late 1980s onwards. Much has been 
written on the historical and contemporary developments in the fi eld of 
environmental justice, and here I will provide a brief summary.
The origins of the environmental justice movement are found at the 
grassroots level across the USA. The movement built upon the 1960s’ 
Civil Rights Movement and the 1970s’ burgeoning federal environmental 
laws, tying together concerns for social justice, human rights and pro-
tection of the environment.1 What became obvious was that environmen-
tal regulations and policies disparately impacted − irrespective of dis-
criminatory intent − poor and deprived communities and marginalised 
1  Kelly D Lynn, ‘Seeking Environmental Justice for Cultural Minorities: The South Law-
rence Traffi cway of Lawrence, Kansas’ (2003) 12 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 
224. For a fi ne overview of legal and policy developments in the fi eld of environmental jus-
tice in the USA, see Jamie Vickery and Lori M. Hunter, ‘Native Americans: Where in Envi-
ronmental Justice Theory and Research?’ (2014) Institute of Behavioral Science, University 
of Colorado, Boulder, Working Paper Population Program POP2014-04 1; also, Alice Kas-
wan, ‘Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and “Justice”’ 
(1997) 47(2) American University Law Review 221.
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racial minorities (mostly African Americans).2 It should, however, also be 
noted that there was (or still is) some scholarly disagreement regarding the 
underlying drivers of environmental inequalities in the US: whether they 
can be ascribed more to (direct or indirect) racial (hence the term environ-
mental racism)3 or socio-economic factors (hence, environmental classism).
The high watermark of the movement came in 1987 with the pub-
lication of the report Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States.4 This 
study proved that locations of hazardous waste sites and polluting in-
dustries across the US corresponded to the racial (predominantly) and 
social characteristics of the surrounding neighbourhoods.5 A parallel 
struggle in the political arena culminated with President Clinton’s Ex-
ecutive Order No 12898 entitled “Federal Actions to Address Environ-
mental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations”.6 
Although commendable in language,7 Executive Order 12898 was not 
legally binding or judicially enforceable.8 Nevertheless, it did lead to some 
2  See David J  Galalis, ‘Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v San-
doval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron’ (2004) 31(1) Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 62-63, who argues that ‘poor, minority communities 
are exposed to a disproportionately greater share of environmental hazards than affl uent, 
Caucasian neighborhoods − not because of invidious racism, but as a result of neutral 
decisions made within intrinsically biased decision-making structures’ (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, Galalis notes that ‘environmental decisions are rarely made today with overt 
discriminatory animus. Rather, it is an economically, politically, and socially entrenched 
reality that these “blind” decisionmaking processes, left to themselves, will subject poor, mi-
nority communities to a disparate share of environmental harm as compared to surrounding 
affl uent, Caucasian neighborhoods’ 101 (emphasis added).
3  David Schlosberg, ‘Theorising Environmental Justice: The Expanding Sphere of a Dis-
course’ (2013) 22(1) Environmental Politics 39: ‘Environmental justice wasn’t simply about 
establishing the fact that more environmental bads and risks were being put on minority 
communities − it endeavoured to explore the question of why those communities were de-
valued in the fi rst place. […] The practice, and experience, of racism has been at the heart 
of environmental justice discourse in the United States […]’.
4  Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National 
Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous 
Waste Sites (United Church of Christ 1987).
5  This situation has not improved but rather deteriorated, as documented in the follow-up 
report by Robert D Bullard and others, Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty 1987-2007 (United 
Church of Christ 2007).
6  59 Fed Reg 7629 (16 February 1994).
7  Section 1−101 reads: ‘To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law […] each 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identify-
ing and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or 
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations […]’. See also Section 1−103 (mandating the development of agen-
cy-wide environmental justice strategies) and Section 2−2 (requiring agencies’ inclusive and 
non-discriminatory operation in environmental matters).
8  Section 6−609: ‘This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the 
executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefi t, or trust re-
sponsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the 
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policy improvements: for instance, the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) nowadays incorporates environmental justice principles in all 
its programmes and publishes Annual Environmental Justice Progress 
Reports;9 the Department of the Interior and some other federal agencies 
have adopted Environmental Justice Strategic Plans;10 the Council on 
Environmental Quality has issued guidelines for federal agencies on how 
to address environmental justice concerns when implementing and ad-
ministering the National Environmental Policy Act,11 etc.
Recently, environmental justice has been spreading throughout the 
world, slowly gaining ground on the other side of the Atlantic, too.12 How-
ever, it has been noted that environmental justice in Europe has different 
connotations due to the continent’s historical-cultural and legal-institu-
tional peculiarities. Thus, Laurent explains: 
United States, its agencies, its offi cers, or any person. This order shall not be construed to 
create any right to judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance of the United 
States, its agencies, its offi cers, or any other person with this order’.
9  EPA, Offi ce of Environmental Justice, available at <www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/
annual-environmental-justice-progress-reports> accessed 28 October 2019. EPA has also 
established the Offi ce of Civil Rights for (among other things) individual complaints alleging 
a discriminatory disparate impact suffered from actions by recipients of the EPA’s fi nancial 
assistance.
10  Department of the Interior, Offi ce of Environmental Policy and Compliance, available at 
<www.doi.gov/oepc/resources/environmental-justice> accessed 28 October 2019; Depart-
ment of Agriculture, US Forest Service, available at <www.fs.fed.us/research/urban/envi-
ronmental-justice> accessed 28 October 2019; Department of Agriculture, US Farm Service 
Agency, available at <www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/environmental-cultur-
al-resource/environmental-justice/> accessed 28 October 2019. For a report on agency ap-
proaches to incorporating environmental justice into their programmes, see Environmental 
Justice Interagency Working Group, ‘Promising Practices for EJ Methodologies in NEPA 
Reviews’ (March 2016) available at <www.epa.gov/sites/production/fi les/2016-08/docu-
ments/nepa_promising_practices_document_2016.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019.
11  Council on Environmental Quality, ‘Environmental Justice: Guidance under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act’ (10 December 1997) 21 available at <https://ceq.doe.
gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance/regs/ej/justice.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019: 
‘Agencies should apply, and comply with, this guidance prospectively. […] This guidance 
is intended to improve the internal management of the Executive Branch with respect to 
environmental justice under NEPA’.
12  Pioneering works emerged during the 2000s in the UK, such as the work of Kevin Dun-
ion, Troublemakers: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Scotland (Edinburgh Universi-
ty Press 2003). For Europe-wide studies, particularly signifi cant was Steve Pye and others, 
‘Addressing the Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy: A Study on the Linkages Be-
tween Environmental and Social Sustainability in Europe’, AEA Energy and Environment − 
Report completed for the European Commission’s Directorate-General Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities (2008), which found ‘evidence which suggests that the 
social distribution of environmental quality is unequal, and often biased against poorer or 
socially excluded groups, ie such groups are more likely to live in areas of poorer environ-
mental quality than other groups’ (iii).
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Europeans highlight the social conditions producing injustices while 
Americans insist on the racial dimension of discriminations and exclu-
sion from decision-making process that ethnic groups suffer. […] The 
general difference in underlying philosophies of public policy is hardly 
surprising: the US approach traditionally recognizes the universality of 
natural rights granted to individuals and aims at curbing discriminations 
faced by them in exercising those rights, while continental European 
countries usually focus on correcting the social processes that produce 
situations of inequalities.13
So, the argument is that some of the key differences include: the 
lack of a European equivalent to the US Civil Rights Movement that is 
seen as the predecessor of the environmental justice movement; the dif-
ferent history and contemporary nature of Europe’s racism; and the legal 
and policy approach to social issues that is somewhat more formalist in 
Europe and more substantive in the US (the question of formal v sub-
stantive justice is taken up later in the paper).
Nevertheless, one thing is becoming clear by now: much as in the 
USA, European policymakers and scholars have realised that ‘challeng-
es to equality and fairness in the environmental domain are many and 
growing within the European Union’.14 
The second idea that informs my discussion, more generally, relates 
to the comparison between the US and the EU. One may wonder wheth-
er there is any use in relying on American academic or policy concepts 
and approaches in analysing Europe-centred problems. This, hopefully, 
should not require much explanation: US-EU comparisons are a frequent 
topic for (especially, but not exclusively) comparative constitutionalists 
and federalism scholars, whereas American legal and political experienc-
es have for a long time been a source of inspiration to a nascent European 
integration project. Many legal scholars have therefore compared different 
policy areas and doctrinal developments in the two bodies politic.15 Here, 
similarly, in analysing the environmental justice issues in the EU, I rely on 
the concepts that were originally proposed in US scholarship.
The third idea (or group of ideas) that this paper greatly benefi ts from 
concerns the critique of law: the ideas introduced by US schools of legal 
13  Éloi Laurent, ‘Issues in Environmental Justice Within the European Union’ (2011) 70 
Ecological Economics 1848-1849 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added); also, Éloi Laurent, 
‘Environmental Justice and Environmental Inequalities: A European perspective’ (2010) 
OFCE/Sciences-Po Working Paper No 2010-05 1.
14  Laurent, ‘Issues in Environmental Justice Within the European Union’ (n 13) 1846.
15  For illustration, see a recent work by Daniel Halberstam, ‘“A People for Certain Purpos-
es”: On the History and Philosophy of Federalism(s) in the United States and Europe’ (2018) 
University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No 619, 3.
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thought that subsequently ‘spilled over’ to Europe. More specifi cally, the 
way American Legal Realists, the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement 
and identity critiques understood law and approached it has gradually 
gained ground in European legal scholarship. These ideas, addressing 
more critically the social functions of law and the policy effects it pro-
duces, will underlie my approach even where I am not explicit about it. 
Here I will highlight only the main propositions that I fi nd inspirational.
Both legal realism and the CLS movement (‘crits’) were deeply scep-
tical of
virtually all of [legalist and legal formalist] various claims: the claim 
that law is distinct from politics, the claim that legal analysis must and 
can be objective, the claim that much of our received legal universe is 
grounded in some sort of necessity, the claim that law proceeds and 
evolves in more or less rational way, and, most important, the claim 
that one can fi nd a meaning or a manageable range of meaning in legal 
texts, and that it is therefore possible to think of the legal enterprise as 
involving the fair application of agreed upon pre-existing rules.16
Rejecting these propositions, CLS scholars have further argued that 
law is a social construct and as such fundamentally indeterminate. Thus, 
‘[t]he same body of law, in the same context, can always lead to contrary 
results because law is indeterminate at its core, in its inception, not just 
in its applications’.17 Moreover, the law is never neutral or objective 
since ‘[l]egal forms and practices are political products that arise from the 
struggles of confl icting social groups that possess very disparate resources 
of wealth, power, status, knowledge […] and organizational capability’.18 
Also, the law serves the interests and purposes of those in power:
discourses of legal and technical rationality, of rights, consent, neces-
sity, effi ciency […] are of course discourses of power […] they are dis-
courses that […] in habitual practice tend to express the interests and 
the perspectives of the powerful people who use them.19
Reading these critiques of law, I cannot but think of them as the 
intellectual brethren of the environmental justice movement that fuelled 
and helped to structure the latter’s critique of environmental inequali-
ties in the USA. In parallel to this, many legal scholars recently started 
16  Stephen E Gottlieb and others (eds), Jurisprudence Cases and Materials: An Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Law and Its Applications (Third Edition, Carolina Academic Press 2015) 
365-366 (emphasis added).
17  Robert W Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 114 (emphasis 
added).
18  Gordon (n 17) 101.
19  Robert W Gordon, ‘Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law’ (1987) 15(2) 
Florida State University Law Review 199 (emphasis added).
221CYELP 15 [2019] 215-267
adopting the same approach in analysing European law.20 Their insights 
and observations are built upon in this paper.
With this remark I close (rather convincingly, I hope) the circle of 
three ideas − environmental justice, a US-EU comparison, the critique of 
law − which I will combine and work on in the remainder of this paper.
2. Environmental (in)justice(s) in Europe: where to look for them? 
There are at least three ways to approach the question of environ-
mental (in)justice(s) in or involving Europe.21
First, one might address environmental injustice at the global level 
and look into the North-South divide, an ever-widening gap between the 
developed and developing world. For instance, Carmen Gonzalez noted 
that ‘[t]he primary cause of global environmental degradation is the un-
sustainable consumption of environmental resources by the most eco-
nomically privileged, most of whom reside in the global North’.22
The landmark 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC) also recognised the developed (industrialised) 
20  See, as an example, Tamara Perišin and Siniša Rodin (eds), The Transformation or Re-
constitution of Europe: The Critical Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of the Courts in the 
European Union (Hart Publishing 2018).
21  Laurent (n 13) 1848 recognised ‘two dimensions [that] co-exist: a fi rst dimension has to 
do with the important ecological debt the European Union has been accumulating at least 
since the industrial revolution vis-à-vis poor and developing countries in terms of carbon 
budget and resources use (global environmental justice); the second dimension regards 
intra and inter-generational aspects of environmental justice within the European Union 
(local, national and regional environmental justice)’. A similar approach to the question of 
economic inequalities and injustice has been proposed by Tamara Perišin and Sam Kople-
wicz, ‘Blame it on Brussels: EU Law and the Distributive Effects of Globalisation’ (2018) 14 
Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy VII-VIII: ‘In the EU context, there are in fact 
three perspectives [on economic inequality]: inequality between EU citizens and third coun-
try nationals, inequality between the EU centre and its periphery, and inequality within a 
single Member State’.
22  Carmen G Gonzalez, ‘Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law’ in 
Shawkat Alam, Md Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera 
(eds), Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge 2013) 78ff: ‘Twen-
ty per cent of the world’s population consumes approximately 85 per cent of the planet’s 
timber, 70 per cent of its energy, and 60 per cent of its food. This population is also re-
sponsible for more than 90 per cent of the world’s annual production of hazardous waste, 
some of which is exported to Southern countries and contributes to illness and widespread 
environmental harm. […] While the affl uent reap the benefi ts of unsustainable economic ac-
tivity, the burdens are borne disproportionately by the global South and by the world’s most 
vulnerable communities, including indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
the poor. Some scholars have described the ecological segregation of the world’s population 
along economic and racial lines as “eco-apartheid”’ (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). For 
another account of the distributive dimensions of environmental justice in relationships be-
tween nation-states, see Peter Newell, ‘Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental 
Inequality’ (2005) 5(3) Global Environmental Politics 70.
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countries’ disproportionate contribution to climate change and other en-
vironmental harms and noted ‘that the largest share of historical and 
current global emissions has originated’ in the global North.
In this context, European countries, being the core of the global 
North, have contributed extraordinarily to global environmental deg-
radation and climate change. Looking at the historical roots of global 
distributive environmental injustice, Europe’s role becomes even more 
prominent and appears inseparable from its colonial history:
When European nations conquered America, they laid the groundwork 
for contemporary disparities in wealth and well-being. […] Having pros-
pered on the basis of resources extracted from its colonial possessions, 
the global North continues to exploit the global South at prices that 
do not refl ect social and environmental externalities. In addition, the 
global North industrialised rapidly and cheaply by using more than its 
fair share of the global commons, and its per capita ecological footprint 
continues to dwarf that of the global South.23
The criterion often used for visualising the responsibility for global 
environmental harms are greenhouse gas emissions. Twenty-eight (cur-
rently) EU Member States occupy the top end of all lists of global pollut-
ers, contemporarily and historically (controlled for size), outranked only 
by the USA and more recently China.24 In addition, European countries 
have suffered from environmental harms disproportionately less than 
the majority of other countries in the world, especially the developing 
ones.25
23  Gonzalez (n 22) 80ff: ‘The riches of the New World triggered a scramble among European 
countries for colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. By 1800, Europe controlled 55 per 
cent of the global land mass. By 1914, 84.4 per cent of the planet’s territory was under the 
effective control of Europe and the US […]’ (footnotes omitted).
24  I have consulted a number of databases, such as CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World 
Resources Institute (2015) available at <http://cait.wri.org> accessed 28 October 2019, 
measuring ‘Cumulative Total CO
2
 Emissions Excluding Land-Use Change and Forest-
ry from 1850 to 2014 (MtCO2)’ and listing: 1. United States (374583.6723); 2. European 
Union (EU28) (333639.1094); 3. China (168761.7539); CO2 Emissions, Global Carbon Atlas 
(Updated with 2017 fi gures) available at <www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions> 
accessed 28 October 2019, showing the EU28 being second only to the USA (in MtCO2) 
in 1960 and 1990, and third (behind China and the USA) in 2017; Global Historical Emis-
sions, Climate Watch, available at <www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions> accessed 
28 October 2019, measuring ‘all sectors, all GHG, unit: MtCO2e (gigatons)’, and showing: 
(in 1990) 1. USA: 5550.04; 2. EU (28): 4949.77; 3. China: 2833.49; (in 2014) 1. China: 
11600.63; 2. USA: 6319.02; 3. EU (28): 3624.82.
25  This led some authors to propose that the developed (industrialised) countries’ contri-
bution to climate change was a moral wrong that required reparations to vulnerable pop-
ulations in the developing and the least developed countries. See Maxine Burkett, ‘Climate 
Reparations’ (2009) 10(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 509; see also Michael B 
Gerrard, ‘What Does Environmental Justice Mean in an Era of Global Climate Change?’ 
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The North-South gap is, moreover, present in procedural and correc-
tive dimensions of global environmental injustice. Developed countries, 
in many aspects led by the EU and its most powerful Member States, 
have much greater political voice in international decision-making (not 
only in environmental matters).26 At the same time, their responsibility 
for environmental harms has been shielded by ineffi ciencies in the legal 
enforcement of international environmental treaties and in the absence 
of redress mechanisms.27
Second, one might look into environmental injustice at the level of 
individual EU Member States. Robust research on this has started to 
emerge only recently. Perhaps surprisingly, Europe lags behind the US 
in acknowledging and addressing its environmental inequalities.28 There 
are certain obstacles, arguably unknown to American researchers, to 
identifying environmental injustices in different dimensions in the Euro-
pean nation-states, such as the lack of spatial analysis and statistics or 
unreliable socio-economic data.29
(2013) 19(2) Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 278 (discussing environ-
mental justice challenges and implications for climate change mitigation and adaptation). A 
separate question, raised by one reviewer, that I nevertheless do not take up in this paper, 
is how addressing environmental injustice at the global level helps address environmental 
injustice in Europe (discussed below). There may be a fl ip side to the same question: how 
addressing environmental injustice in Europe helps address environmental injustice at the 
global level. This essentially asks for an assessment of the relationship between, and the 
appropriate order of, the two courses of action, ie internal (intra-EU) and external (world-
wide) actions. Although interesting, these questions are not my primary focus here and 
would in any event merit careful, individual treatment.
26  Gonzalez (n 22) 79: ‘In addition to this distributive injustice, North-South relations are 
also plagued by procedural inequities. The North dominates decision-making in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
multilateral environmental treaty fora as a consequence of its greater economic and political 
clout. While the South can present alternative points of view, the preferences of the powerful 
generally dictate the substantive outcomes’ (emphasis added).
27  ibid: ‘Corrective injustice is evident in the plight of small island states whose very ex-
istence is threatened by climate change, but who possess no legal mechanism to obtain 
compensation or cessation of the harmful conduct. In addition, North-South environmental 
confl icts refl ect broader social injustice because they are inextricably intertwined with colo-
nial and postcolonial economic policies that impoverished the global South and facilitated 
the North’s appropriation of its natural resources’ (footnotes omitted).
28  Laurent (n 13) 1849: ‘Europe, as much as the US, is confronted with the challenge of 
environmental justice (European social policies cannot ignore anymore health, socio-eco-
nomic and well-being impacts resulting from poorer environmental conditions faced by 
their most vulnerable citizens). The European particularism here is only that European 
Union member states are generally lagging behind and must catch up. This is all the more 
surprising [given] that Europeans and Americans do differ in their attention to redressing 
inequalities, with Europeans supposedly keener on correcting them than Americans’ (em-
phasis added).
29  Most notably, in France, minority and race are not constitutionally recognised as cat-
egories, nor are they recorded in census or socio-demographic data. See Lucie Laurian, 
‘Environmental Injustice in France’ (2008) 51(1) Journal of Environmental Planning and 
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Still, there are clear cases of both environmental classism and raci-
sm, where minority communities are found to suffer disproportional-
ly from environmental harms: for instance, in the UK,30 France,31 Ger-
many,32 Italy,33 or the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.34 With 
the greater availability of empirical data and the increase in scholarly in-
terest, these and similar cases of environmental injustice in Europe will 
become even more apparent, especially given the suspected patterns of 
ethnic and socio-economic segregation in big European cities like Brus-
sels, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Marseille or Paris.35 For now, by 
Management 59. See also Hilary Silver and Lauren Danielowski, ‘Fighting Housing Discrim-
ination in Europe’ (2019) Housing Policy Debate, Forthcoming Special Issue: Fair Housing 
Act: 50th Anniversary: ‘[T]he extent of racial or ethnic segregation is often diffi cult to gauge 
because not all [European] countries collect statistics on small areas or on race or religion. 
For example, the French Constitution’s prohibition on discrimination based on race has led 
the Constitutional Court to systematically object to any offi cial collection of information on 
racial/ethnic identity. In 2018, the National Assembly even voted to remove the word “race” 
from Article 1 of France’s constitution. […] European governments consider the state’s 
collection of data on race and ethnicity, as in the United States, to be overly intrusive, es-
pecially after the Nazi regime’s disastrous use of such data’.
30  UK Government, ‘UK notifi cation to the European Commission to extend the compliance 
deadline for meeting PM
10
 limit values in ambient air to 2011 − Racial Equality Impact As-
sessment (England)’ (August 2009) (identifying the disproportionate impact of air pollution, 
measured as exposure to concentrations of PM
10
, on ethnic and racial groups, especially on 
those identifying as Black or Black-British African).
31  Laurian’s research (n 29) demonstrates that ‘towns with high proportions of immigrants 
tend to host more hazardous sites, even controlling for population size, income, [or] degree 
of industrialization of the town and region’ 55. See also Jean-Francois Viel and others, 
‘Environmental Justice in a French Industrial Region: Are Polluting Industrial Facilities 
Equally Distributed?’ (2011) 17 Health & Place 257.
32  Tamara Steger (ed), Making the Case for Environmental Justice in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEU Center for Environmental Policy and Law, The Health and Environment Al-
liance, The Coalition for Environmental Justice 2007) 15: ‘In Germany, immigrants and 
less economically viable communities seem to bear the brunt of environmental injustices. 
Turkish immigrants, for example, work in unsafe conditions and subsequently live near 
highly polluting factories’.
33  Marco Martuzzi, Francesco Mitis and Francesco Forastiere, ‘Inequalities, Inequities, En-
vironmental Justice in Waste Management and Health’ 20(1) European Journal of Public 
Health 21-22: ‘Available data provide consistent indications that waste facilities are of-
ten disproportionally more located in areas with more deprived residents, or […] ethnical 
minorities. This applies to waste incinerators, landfi lls, hazardous waste sites, legal and 
illegal. […] A direct relationship was found between social class and residence near waste 
facilities in Italy and UK’.
34  Csaba Varga, István Kiss and István Ember, ‘The Lack of Environmental Justice in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe’ (2002) 110(11) Environmental Health Perspectives A662-A663: 
‘In some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, environmentally hazardous sites and 
activities are also disproportionally located, with high concentrations in the areas and com-
munities of ethnic or national minorities.’
35  Sako Musterd, ‘Social and Ethnic Segregation in Europe: Levels, Causes, and Effects’ 
(2005) 27(3) Journal of Urban Affairs 331 (comparing levels of ethnic and socio-economic 
segregation in American and European cities and noting that analyses in Europe are con-
strained by the lack of systematic data); John Iceland, Residential Segregation: A Transat-
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far the most horrifi c examples of environmental injustice have been re-
corded in the case of Roma people (especially Romani communities in 
Central and Eastern Europe), which further proves the ugly truth that 
this (over-)marginalised ethnic minority is the epitome of the European 
‘abject other’.36
Third, and fi nally, one might look into possible environmental injus-
tice not externally (globally) or internally (within EU countries), but at the 
regional, intermediate level, ie between different EU Member States. This 
is the approach that I adopt here and elaborate in the following sections. 
The background is as follows: a structural divide within the EU that re-
cently came into focus is between the ‘old’ Member States of Western and 
Northern Europe and the ‘new’ Member States of Central and (South-)
Eastern Europe that joined the Union in three enlargement waves during 
the 2000s and the 2010s. This ‘invisible’ divide has been conceptualised 
as the ‘centre’ (or ‘core’) v the ‘periphery’.37 Damjan Kukovec suggests 
that this divide and the related power dynamics are inherent in the legal 
and institutional structure of the EU.38 He and other European critical 
scholars have recently identifi ed legal, socio-economic and policy out-
lantic Analysis (Migration Policy Institute − Transatlantic Council on Migration, September 
2014) (arguing that in many European countries residential segregation is a relatively re-
cent immigration-related phenomenon, with different roots from − but similar effects to 
− residential segregation in the US). Also, Silver and Danielowski (n 29) remarked that 
‘[i]n Europe, the growth in ethnic populations, the mass arrival of refugees, urban riots and 
terrorist incidents in central cities, and the anti-immigrant rhetoric of far-right parties all 
contribute to public fears of ghettoization’.
36  See Steger (n 32) (providing ground-breaking research on environmental justice in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and documenting cases of environmental injus-
tices and the Roma community’s exposure to pollution, fl ooding, denied benefi ts in access 
to water, waste management, sewerage, and natural resources); Krista Harper, Tamara 
Steger and Richard Filcak, ‘Environmental Justice and Roma Communities in Central and 
Eastern Europe’ (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and Governance 252: ‘[I]n certain loca-
tions, members of ethnic minorities, communities of lower socioeconomic status and the 
least educated disproportionately (1) suffer from exposure to environmental hazards due to 
their proximity to hazardous waste sites, incinerators, factories, abandoned industrial fa-
cilities and other sources of pollution and/or (2) are denied environmental benefits such as 
potable water, sewage treatment facilities, sanitation and access to natural resources and/
or (3) witness the conceptualization of their living space as “beyond the pale” areas where 
environmentally controversial practices are concentrated’; Attila Antal, ‘Climate and Social 
Justice in Eastern and Southern Europe: The Social Nature of Climate Change’ (2018) 
Working Paper 1, INOGOV Network: Innovations in Climate Governance 3 (discussing chal-
lenges related to environmental and climate injustice regarding Roma communities in the 
Eastern and Southern European regions). 
37  Damjan Kukovec, ‘Law and the Periphery’ (2015) 21(3) European Law Journal 408: ‘[T]he 
position of the EU’s periphery is not reflected in the existing EU legal discourse. First, the 
way the EU is structured and the way issues are framed for discussion makes it difficult to 
notice and address distributional consequences of the EU legal structure between the cen-
tre and the periphery. Second, many of the periphery’s  aspirations and claims for protection 
against harm are foreclosed from operating powerfully in the Union’.
38  ibid, 407.
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comes unevenly distributed among different Member States due to the 
structural bias of the EU internal market in favour of citizens, workers, 
goods, services, companies and industries from the EU’s centre, which 
creates hierarchies between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in relation to EU 
integration.39 Therefore, the EU’s institutional setup and internal market 
tend to operate not to level-down economic inequalities between the EU 
centre and periphery, but to amplify them and make the rich richer and 
the poor poorer.40
Echoing US critical legal scholars, this group of authors claims that 
EU law serves the purposes of the powerful centre, often masking the 
centre’s particular interests as the EU’s ‘universal’ interest.41 Recent 
comprehensive studies confi rm that the impact of the EU internal mar-
ket, a fl agship EU integration project ‘for everyone’ and arguably its rai-
son d’être, on real incomes (that is, on the GDP per capita and per year) is 
the strongest in the ‘core’ EU countries and regions who thus reap much 
more benefi t than the EU’s periphery (Member States in Southern and 
Eastern Europe).42 So, Mion and Ponattu conclude, these uneven ‘gains 
from the [internal market] may further reinforce pre-existing regional 
differences, this way adding to the core-periphery pattern and inequality 
more generally’.43
39  Damjan Kukovec, ‘Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on the EU Internal 
Market’ (2016) 38(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 1; Tamara Perišin, ‘Transfor-
mation or Reconstitution of National Regulatory Policies at the EU Level: Insiders and Out-
siders under Free Movement Rules’ in Tamara Perišin and Siniša Rodin (eds), The Trans-
formation or Reconstitution of Europe. The Critical Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of 
the Courts in the European Union (Hart Publishing 2018) 153; Marija Bartl, ‘Internal Market 
Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the 
Object of the Political’ (2015) 21(5) European Law Journal 572.
40  Kukovec (n 37) 410.
41  ibid, 423.
42  Giordano  Mion and Dominic Ponattu, Estimating Economic Benefi ts of the Single Market 
for European Countries and Regions: Policy Paper (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2019) 1, avail-
able at <www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fi leadmin/fi les/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublika-
tionen/EZ_Study_SingleMarket.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019, who note that ‘observed 
trends are largely consistent with the widely discussed “core-periphery” pattern across EU’ 
(6); although ‘some Eastern European countries see strong relative welfare gains [from the 
EU internal market], while monetary gains in absolute terms are low […] other countries in 
the periphery […] see both low welfare gains in absolute and relative terms, suggesting that, 
at least partly, gains from the [internal market] follow a core-periphery logic: Countries in 
the southern and eastern European periphery do not appear to gain in the same way that 
countries in the core do’ (11).
43  ibid, 23. See, in particular, Figure 4 showing per capita welfare gains from the internal 
market that perfectly follows the distribution of Member States into ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ 
categories, and almost perfectly the distribution into ‘semi-periphery’ and ‘periphery’ (21).
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At the top of the hierarchy there would usually be the same Member 
States from the EU centre that include Germany, France, the UK, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland,44 while the bottom is occupied by the EU’s peripheral Member 
States, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cro-
atia.45 Notably, almost the entire EU periphery is made up of post-com-
munist countries that underwent democratic and economic transition 
in the 1990s that caused the even greater impoverishment of their most 
vulnerable communities and regions.46
44  Kukovec (n 37) 408-409 explains that Member States of the centre have ‘much higher gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita than the regions of the periphery; they invest more money 
in research and development and have the best universities; they have more capital and more 
ingoing and outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI). Their actors, products and services have 
more prestige. Internationally recognised brands come from the centre, which gives the com-
panies owning them a significant power on the market. […] Generally, companies of the centre 
find themselves higher in European and global production chains. The centre exports final 
products and is the seat of powerful corporations and law firms’ (footnotes omitted).
45  ibid, 409: ‘The periphery has much weaker industry and a less efficient agricultural 
sector. It has no (or very few) brands known beyond its borders. Non-branded companies 
typically earn lower margins and are constantly at risk of being undercut by cheaper rivals. 
Some of the few famous brands of Eastern Europe have in fact been bought by established 
companies of the centre. Regions of the periphery have a lower GDP per capita, and the ac-
tors, products and services from the periphery have much less prestige. They often produce 
semi-final products or final products for a brand of the centre. Generally, companies of 
the periphery find themselves lower in European and global production chains. The wages 
are lower than in the centre, and often (with the exception of the European south) the life 
expectancy is lower’ (footnotes omitted). Kukovec further notes that Member States like 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece or Ireland could be considered in some respects as ‘centre’ 
and in others as ‘periphery’, thus designating them as ‘semi-periphery’. Here, in response 
to a reviewer’s comment, it should also be noted that the choice of individual countries 
as the relevant units of analysis and comparison seems inevitable. Granted, there may be 
some variables (like consumption, instead of industrial emissions, as a measure of contri-
bution to environmental harm) that would privilege, for example, regions rather than coun-
tries as objects of inquiry. However, given that sovereign (nation-)states, conceptualised 
as aggregated subjects with homogenous interests, are still taken as the primary actors in 
international relations and international (environmental) law, this paper follows the same 
approach, acknowledging that in some respects it might appear overgeneralised or simpli-
fi ed. In addition, the progress of EU economic and political integration, in my view, still does 
not render obsolete the concept of individual Member States as units of scholarly analysis.
46  Harper, Steger and Filcak (n 36) 255: ‘The transition to a free market economy in [Cen-
tral and Eastern European] countries has led to further impoverishment of regions, groups 
and individuals that are disadvantaged by new market conditions’ (references omitted). 
And, as documented by research such as that by Mion and Ponattu (n 42), the integration 
of the ‘new’ Member States’ economies in the EU internal market has further contributed 
to the widening of the gap between the EU’s ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in relative terms, as 
well as to growing inequalities (economic and others) within the peripheral Member States 
themselves, as briefl y mentioned above (see the text accompanied by footnotes 34 and 36).
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3 Environmental (in)justice and the EU centre and periphery 
Is it useful to think about environmental (in)justice in the EU through 
the centre-periphery divide?47 I believe there are strong indicators that 
support such an approach. What follows are some arguments that show 
that  the EU periphery has been much less responsible for environmental 
harms in Europe (and in the world) yet bears greater environmental bur-
dens and has less access to environmental decision-making than the EU 
centre. I divide them into categories tracking different dimensions of en-
vironmental justice that were introduced at the beginning: distributive 
on the one hand, and procedural and corrective on the other.
3.1 Distributive injustice
Does distributive environmental injustice between the EU’s centre 
and periphery exist? Here I want to look into the unequal distribution of 
environmental resources, responsibility and burdens between the Mem-
ber States, and the uneven political clout in the EU institutional frame-
work. (Note that it could also be possible to treat the latter as an issue of 
procedural (in)justice; however, I take the distribution of political power 
and institutional resources in the EU as a prima facie issue of distrib-
utive (in)justice. This arguably makes the assessment of this element of 
distributive environmental injustice in the EU more conventional, due 
to an idiosyncratic use of the notion of procedural and corrective envi-
ronmental justice in the context of the Aarhus Convention, as will be 
elaborated in the next part.)
First, the emissions record and ecological footprint. Member States 
of the EU centre have a signifi cantly greater historical emissions record 
than the peripheral ones.48 This holds for both absolute emissions and 
47  See Pamela Ballinger, ‘Whatever Happened to Eastern Europe? Revisiting Europe’s East-
ern Peripheries’ (2017) 31(1) East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 44, for the 
argument (albeit in a different context) that the concept of centre-periphery power dynam-
ics ‘possess[es] continuing political and scholarly relevance’ (46) and ‘offers a particularly 
powerful lens through which to consider the recombinations and intersections of old dis-
tinctions − North versus South, East versus West − shaping the landscape of contemporary 
Europe’ 61.
48  The World Bank, Data: CO
2
 emissions (kt) (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre, 
Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, US) available 
at <https://data.worldbank.org/> accessed 29 October 2019. This dataset measures CO
2
 
emissions per kiloton from 1960. Similar data are shown in Climate Watch (n 24), measur-
ing ‘all sectors, all GHG, unit: MtCO2e (gigatons)’, with 1990 as the base year; and in Global 
Carbon Atlas (n 24), with the earliest record from 1960, measured in MtCO2, and showing 
Germany, the UK, Italy, France, and Poland in the top 10 global polluters. By 2017, only 
Germany has remained in the top 10. Finally, CAIT Climate Data Explorer (n 24), showing 
‘Cumulative Total CO
2
 Emissions Excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry from 1850 to 
2014 (MtCO2)’, lists the EU Member States in the following order (periphery italicised): Ger-
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per capita emissions (albeit less stark for the latter),49 with Poland being 
the only outlier among the peripheral Member States.50 Similar indica-
tors are present for the ecological footprint, where absolute and per cap-
ita values show the greater contribution of the EU centre to environmen-
tal degradation.51
That historical emissions are undeniably much greater in the EU 
centre is largely the result of the 19th century coal-driven industrial revo-
lution. Currently, coal power plants account for around 18% of EU green-
house gas emissions.52 Two of the greatest coal polluters among EU coun-
tries are Germany (fi rst) and Poland (second), accounting for 55% of the 
EU’s total coal generation.53 However, it may be argued that in the case 
of Western and Eastern Europe − more specifi cally, taking into account 
their level of economic development and historical polluting record −con-
temporary coal generation represents so-called ‘luxury’ and ‘necessity’ 
emissions, respectively.
many 86024.7389; United Kingdom 71280.9583; France 34596.7042; Poland 24993.2304; 
Italy 21864.8292; Spain 12794.2567; Belgium 11548.7171; Czech Republic 11228.059; 
Netherlands 10285.1113; Romania 7750.9491; Austria 4996.3337; Sweden 4629.0875; 
Hungary 4554.9729; Denmark 3862.078; Bulgaria 3499.4903; Greece 3470.0734; Slovakia 
3312.872; Finland 2878.9714; Portugal 2224.3081; Ireland 1950.781; Estonia 1317.9452; 
Lithuania 1148.5176; Croatia 934.0579; Slovenia 725.9222; Luxembourg 721.9622; Latvia 
708.8152; Cyprus 243.2793; Malta 92.0882.
49  Compare CO
2
 emissions per kiloton for Central Europe and the Baltics (Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia): 1960 − 466,533 (low); 1979 − 1,168,855; 1987 − 1,241,032 (peak); 2014 
− 636,386; for the European Union (all current 28 countries): 1960 − 2,359,595 (low); 1979 
− 4,647,644 (peak); 1987 − 4,258,990; 2014 − 3,241,844. Also, CO
2
 emissions (metric tons 
per capita) for Central Europe and the Baltics: 1960 − 5.1; 1980 − 11.3 (peak); 1992 − 7.9; 
2014 − 6.1; for the European Union: 1960 − 5.8; 1979 − 10.0 (peak); 1992 − 8.3; 2014 − 
6.4. Luxembourg has the biggest historical (and contemporary) per capita emissions in the 
entire EU. Although per capita emissions observed in per annum fi gures might suggest to 
some that no signifi cant differences exist between the EU centre and periphery, it should 
be noted that these differences have remained constant for decades of measurements, most 
probably stretching beyond the base year (1960) due to the differentiated industrial devel-
opment in the Europe’s West and East.
50  In 2014, the EU top 6 in CO
2
 emissions per kiloton were: Germany 719,883; United 
Kingdom 419,820; Italy 320,411; France 303,276; Poland 285,740; Spain 233,977.
51  Global Footprint Network, available at <http://data.footprintnetwork.org> accessed 29 
October 2019. The Ecological Footprint is a measure combining the use of built-up land, 
carbon, cropland, fi shing grounds, forest products, grazing land, and expressed as ‘gha − 
global hectare’. The 1993 (the earliest) and 2014 (the latest) measures for ‘gha − global hect-
are per person’ showed Luxembourg, Denmark and Belgium on the top. The 1993 and 2014 
measures for ‘gha − global hectare total’ showed Germany, the UK and France on the top.
52  Europe Beyond Coal, Database of Europe’s Coal Plants, available at <https://be-
yond-coal.eu/data/> accessed 29 October 2019.
53  Silvio Marcacci, ‘Uneconomic Coal Could Be Squeezed Out of European Union Power 
Markets by 2030’ (Forbes, 11 June 2018), available at <www.forbes.com/sites/energyinno-
vation/2018/06/11/uneconomic-coal-could-be-squeezed-out-of-european-union-power-
markets-by-2030/#4937824c4179> accessed 29 October 2019.
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What is also notable here is that all Member States of the EU cen-
tre have either closed their coal plants or announced their shutdown,54 
whereas no peripheral EU Member State (with currently operating coal 
plants) has announced a phase out.55 On the contrary, in some coun-
tries (mainly Poland, Greece and other countries in the South-Eastern 
Europe) new coal plants are being constructed or planned.56 This indi-
cates that a high-polluting coal and lignite57 industry has moved from 
the centre (Western Europe) to the periphery (Eastern Europe); not lit-
erally, of course (as in one plant shutting down production in the West 
and reopening in the East, although some other Western producers, for 
instance car companies, might have indeed moved some pollution-in-
tensive segments of their production process to Eastern Europe). Still, 
despite everything, the centre nowadays remains a greater polluter than 
the periphery, measured by CO
2
 emission from coal and MW operating 
capacity,58 while the periphery arguably suffers more overall.59 More gen-
erally, coal generation harms the EU’s effort to tackle climate change 
and reduce its emissions reported in the framework of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement.60
54  ibid. For instance, France by 2023, Italy and the UK by 2025, and the Netherlands by 
2030 (accounting for 22% of total EU generation), while Germany is expected to set an end 
date in 2019.
55  Climate Analytics, A Stress Test for Coal in Europe under the Paris Agreement. Scientifi c 
Goalposts for a Coordinated Phase-Out and Divestment (February 2017).
56  The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Europe Energy: Coal Use Falls again in Europe in 
2017’ The Economist (London, 28 February 2018) available at <www.eiu.com/industry/
article/1846475768/coal-use-falls-again-in-europe-in-2017/2018-02-28> accessed 29 
October 2019. (‘In Eastern Europe, however, dependence on coal remains high: this region 
accounts for fi ve of the six EU member states where coal provides more than 30% of power 
generation. This is because of sizeable coal deposits (including lignite) in several parts of 
Eastern Europe, which support the production of affordable electricity, reduce the need 
for energy imports, and maintain employment in the mining sector. Furthermore, renew-
ables usage in this region has been stunted by lack of policy support and the high costs of 
fi nancing’).
57  ibid: ‘A large share of Europe’s coal generation (46%) is also sourced from carbon-inten-
sive lignite. Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania account for almost 
all of the EU’s lignite use, which is also used in some non-EU states in the Western Bal-
kans. Easing the region’s dependence on lignite would contribute signifi cantly to reducing 
Europe’s power sector emissions. However, the EU would need to support the region’s more 
vulnerable economies as they made this transition [to renewables], to minimise the social 
and economic costs and prevent a policy backlash’.
58  Europe Beyond Coal (n 52).
59  Climate Analytics (n 55) 3: ‘Coal power stations in fi ve countries contributed more than 
a quarter to total national GHG emissions: 28% in Germany, 33% in Poland and in Czech 
Republic, 34% in Greece and as much as 44% in Bulgaria.’
60  ibid, 1.
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Second, waste generation. In general, the production and export of 
waste in the EU has grown signifi cantly during recent decades.61 Current 
data show that Member States of the EU centre are the primary waste 
producers in Europe, with a few outliers.62 The same countries are the 
EU’s greatest generators of hazardous waste, too:63 entities that produce 
hazardous waste are predominantly located in the Member States of the 
EU centre.64 Moreover, the production of hazardous waste is increasing 
in the EU centre, while decreasing in its periphery.65
There are also some issues with illegal waste shipping from the EU 
centre to the periphery, where Western European companies are dump-
ing waste (so-called ‘waste tourism’) in the EU’s East.66 This seems to be 
61  European Environment Agency, Movements of Waste Across the EU’s Internal and Ex-
ternal Borders, EEA Report No 7/2012 (EU Offi ce for Offi cial Publications 2012) 5: ‘[T]he 
growth in cross-border waste trade during recent years has been remarkable. Exports of 
waste iron and steel, and copper, aluminium and nickel from Member States doubled be-
tween 1999 and 2011, while waste precious metal exports increased by a factor of three and 
waste plastics by a factor of fi ve. Similarly, exports of hazardous waste more than doubled 
in the period 2000−2009’.
62  Eurostat, Waste Statistics, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-ex-
plained/index.php/Waste_statistics> accessed 29 October 2019. (‘As might be expected, 
the overall amount of waste generated is related to some extent to the population and 
economic size of a country. [T]he smallest EU Member States generally reported the lowest 
levels of waste generation and the larger ones the highest. Nevertheless, relatively high 
quantities of waste were generated in Bulgaria and Romania [mostly from mining and quar-
rying] and a relatively low quantity in Italy’.)
63  Mahelet G Fikru, ‘Trans-boundary Movement of Hazardous Waste: Evidence from a New 
Micro Data in the European Union’ (2012) 4(1) Review of European Studies 3. Note also 
that ‘96% of the export stays within Europe and rarely goes to developing countries. […] The 
large share of trade in hazardous waste among EU Member States is mainly due to Regu-
lation (EC) No 1013/2006 (also known as Waste Shipment Regulation) which prohibits the 
export of hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries’ 3-5 (footnotes omitted).
64  More than two-thirds of the EU’s total come from Spain, Italy, the UK, France, and Ger-
many. From the EU periphery, hazardous waste producers come mostly from Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. See Fikru (n 63) 10.
65  European Environment Agency (n 61) 11: ‘There is clear evidence that EU output of haz-
ardous waste is increasing. […] [H]owever, the aggregate growth masks contrasting trends 
within the EU. Whereas EU-15 output of hazardous waste grew substantially (70%) in the 
period 1997−2009, EU-12 production actually declined by 36%. […] Among EU Member 
States, Germany generated the most hazardous waste in 2009 with 17 million tonnes (Mt). 
It was followed by Italy (11 Mt), France (11 Mt) and Estonia (7 Mt). Estonia’s large output of 
hazardous waste primarily results from oil shale mining (95%)’.
66  European Environment Agency, Waste Without Borders in the EU? Transboundary 
Shipments of Waste. EEA Report No 1/2009 (EC Offi ce for Offi cial Publications 2009) 
4 and 11-12. However, these accounts are hard to verify due to a lack of information 
and enforcement. See also Martuzzi, Mitis and Forastiere (n 33) 23: ‘[B]esides differential 
levels of exposure to waste-related contaminants by socio-economic levels at local or na-
tional level, inequalities in exposure might take place at the international level, through 
the transfer of related hazards from one country to another. In fact, illegal shipment and 
disposal of hazardous waste is of growing relevance in some countries of central and 
eastern Europe’.
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a continuation of unjust practices that started in recent decades, before 
the EU’s eastern enlargement: 
richer countries [are using] poor countries as a ‘sink’ for pollution and 
waste. […] A similar dynamic has emerged within Europe, where com-
panies in the more prosperous regions of the European Union are out-
sourcing waste disposal to municipalities in poorer countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe [CEE]. This process began in the early 1990s, 
when the change of political systems facilitated trade between east 
and west, and when one German fi rm infamously exported hazardous 
waste to Albania in barrels labeled ‘humanitarian aid’. The east-west 
trade in waste has accelerated with CEE countries’ accession into the 
European Union.67
On a global level, there are concerns about the shipments of waste 
from the EU to developing countries (especially in Western Africa),68 
again with possibly the greater involvement of the EU centre as the pre-
dominant waste producer. 
Third, energy poverty and living conditions,69 both inextricably re-
lated to the state of the environment. Most of the energy poverty indi-
cators show the presence of the centre-periphery divide in the EU.70 For 
instance, data on arrears on utility bills,71 the inability to keep the home 
67  Steger (n 32) 16 (footnotes omitted), and further: ‘In January 2007, a major Hungarian 
news outlet reported that dozens of small municipalities and fi rms in Hungary have made 
contracts for German fi rms to dump their waste, in most cases without consulting local res-
idents. Such cases offer a lens on the international and local dimensions of environmental 
inequalities’.
68  European Environment Agency (n 61) 5: ‘[Although] hazardous waste exports over-
whelmingly stay within the EU, primarily going to neighbouring countries […] a substantial 
proportion of non-hazardous waste exports goes to non-EU destinations’. Also, ‘E-waste is 
normally classifi ed as hazardous and it is therefore illegal for EU Member States to export it 
to non-OECD countries. Despite shortcomings in EU data on e-waste trade, however, there 
are many indications that a substantial portion of Europe’s e-waste is exported to areas 
such as West Africa and Asia, disguised as used goods (6). […] Treatment in these coun-
tries usually occurs in the informal sector, causing signifi cant environmental pollution and 
health risks for local populations’ (26).
69  Stefan Bouzarovski and Sergio Tirado Herrero, ‘The Energy Divide: Integrating Energy 
Transitions, Regional Inequalities and Poverty Trends in the European Union’ (2017) 24(1) 
European Urban and Regional Studies 69: ‘Energy poverty can be understood as the inabil-
ity of a household to secure a socially and materially necessitated level of energy services 
in the home’.
70  EU Energy Poverty Observatory, Indicators & Data, available at <www.energypoverty.eu/
indicators-data> accessed 29 October 2019. These data are summarised in European Ener-
gy Network, ‘Position Paper on Energy Poverty in the European Union’ (January 2019) 6-7.
71  EU Energy Poverty Observatory (n 70), ‘Arrears on utility bills’ (% of population): above 
EU average (of about 10% of population) are Greece (above 35%, the most), Bulgaria, Cro-
atia, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia and Cyprus (Poland and Lithuania follow, just 
below the average).
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adequately warm,72 poverty risk,73 the presence of leak, damp or rot in 
the dwelling,74 or energy expenses75 all demonstrate that Member States 
of the EU periphery (in some instances, semi-peripheral Member States 
included) are disproportionally affected by problems related to energy 
poverty. In other words,
[w]hile the [energy poverty] is widespread across Europe, its spatial and 
social distribution is highly uneven. […] [T]he classic economic develop-
ment distinction between the core and periphery also holds true in the 
case of energy poverty, as the incidence of this phenomenon is signifi -
cantly higher in Southern and Eastern European EU Member States.76
Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero in their recent study further 
challenge the fi ndings of previous studies by suggesting that the tradi-
tional division of EU states into three clusters is increasingly replaced 
by a relatively well-off ‘core’ group of countries in Northern and Western 
Europe, and a heterogeneous ‘energy poverty periphery’ in the South 
and East. In the former, domestic energy deprivation is limited to spe-
cifi c demographic and housing groups, while the latter exhibits a more 
pervasive presence of the problem across a range of social strata.77
Moreover, this ‘energy poverty’ divide is arguably furthered by the 
EU energy market regulation and clean energy transition strategy.78 (Lat-
er in the paper, I address in greater detail the link between the EU (envi-
72  ibid, ‘Inability to keep home adequately warm’ (% of population): above EU average (of 
about 10%) are Bulgaria (above 40%, the most), Lithuania, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Lat-
via, Romania and Croatia (Hungary, Poland and Spain follow, just below average).
73  ibid, ‘Poverty risk’ (people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, % of population): above 
EU average (of about 23%) are Bulgaria (around 40%, the most), Romania, Greece, Lithua-
nia, Italy, Latvia, Cyprus, Spain, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland and Portugal.
74  ibid, ‘Presence of leak, damp, rot’ (% of population with leak, damp or rot in their dwell-
ing): above EU average (of around 14%) are Portugal (with more than 30%, the most), Hun-
gary, Cyprus, Slovenia, Latvia, Belgium (outlier from the EU centre), Lithuania, Estonia and 
Greece (with Spain just below the average).
75  ibid,  ‘Energy expenses, income quintile 1-5’ (consumption expenditure for electricity, gas 
and other fuels as a % of income for income quintile 1-5): Czech Republic (almost 18% of 
population, the most), Slovakia, Greece, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Slove-
nia, Lithuania, Germany (outlier, just above 8%).
76  Bouzarovski and Tirado Herrero (n 69) 69ff: ‘[T]he existence of a geographical energy 
poverty divide in the [EU] provides a starting point for conceptualizing and exploring the 
relationship between energy transitions − commonly described as wide-ranging processes of 
socio-technical change − and existing patterns of regional economic inequality’.
77  ibid, 82ff: ‘[T]he notion of the “energy divide” can be expanded from its original predom-
inantly socially orientated meaning […] to encapsulate existing inequalities in access to 
infrastructure services at the scale of cities, regions and countries’.
78  ibid, 83: ‘There is also a necessity for acknowledging the price and energy poverty risks 
posed by wider energy transition processes stemming from the liberalization and privatiza-
tion of the energy sector and the long-term transition to a low-carbon future’.
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ronmental, energy, market) regulation and environmental injustice and 
inequalities).
Regarding living conditions, besides a clear centre-periphery divide 
in energy poverty and income distribution,79 there is a similar geograph-
ical difference in overcrowded households,80 as well as pollution, grime 
and other environmental issues,81 found to be more prevalent in the EU 
periphery.
Fourth, air quality. Recent data indicate that in many respects the 
quality of ambient air is notably worse in the peripheral than in the cen-
tre EU Member States.82 For example, Member States of the periphery 
have been indicated as predominantly exposed to particulate matter pol-
lution, among them Bulgaria, Greece, and Poland having the worst air 
quality.83 Similarly, concentrations of benzo[a]pyrene and carbon mon-
oxide have been the highest in Central and Eastern European Member 
States, like Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia.84 High lev-
els of benzene concentrations have likewise been disproportionally pres-
79  Eurostat, Living Conditions in Europe − 2018 edition (EU Publications Offi ce) 9: ‘[Data 
reveal] a clear geographical divide, insofar as the highest levels of median disposable income 
were generally recorded in western and Nordic Member States, although the level of income 
was also above the EU-28 average in Malta. By contrast, median disposable incomes were 
generally lower in southern Europe, while the lowest levels of income were recorded in east-
ern Europe and the Baltic Member States’.
80  ibid, 54: ‘Overall, 16.6% of the Europeans lived in an overcrowded household in 2016. 
There were considerable differences between European Union (EU) Member States, with 
overcrowding more prevalent in the southern and eastern Member States’.
81  ibid, 64-65: ‘[N]oise was the main problem reported in a majority (20 out of 28) of the EU 
Member States in 2016. It was however more common to fi nd that people in Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia complained about problems relating to pollution, grime 
or other environmental issues’.
82  European Environment Agency, Air Quality in Europe − 2018 Report (EU Publications 
Offi ce 2018). See also European Air Quality Index, available at <http://airindex.eea.eu-
ropa.eu/> accessed 29 October 2019 (picturing ‘the air quality divide’, ie a divide in the 
toxic particulate matter air pollution between the countries of South-Eastern and East-
ern Europe and the counties of Western Europe); Zoë Schlanger, ‘There’s an iron curtain 
dividing Europe into safe and dangerous places to breathe’ (Quartz, 30 January 2018) 
available at <https://qz.com/1192348/europe-is-divided-into-safe-and-dangerous-places-
to-breathe/> accessed 29 October 2019.
83  The European Environment Agency’s report (n 82) measures, among other things, ‘PM10 
(particulate matter with a diameter of 10 μm or less) concentrations in relation to the daily 
and annual limit value in 2016’ (27, 29); ‘PM2.5 (particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 
μm or less) concentrations in relation to the annual limit value in 2016’ (31); ‘Average Expo-
sure Indicator in 2016’ and exposure concentration obligation (33). See also concentration 
interpolated maps of PM10 (annual mean, μg/m3), PM2.5 (annual mean, μg/m3), NO2 
(annual mean, μg/m3), and O3 (SOMO35, μg/m3.days) for the year 2015 (58).
84  ibid, ‘European air quality standard and reference level for benzo[a]pyrene (BaP)’: ‘A total 
of 13 Member States measured concentrations above 1.0 ng/m3 in 2016 (see Figure 7.1). 
As in previous years, values above 1.0 ng/m3 are most predominant in central and eastern 
Europe’ (48-50). See also ‘Data on concentrations of carbon monoxide (CO) in 2016’ (52).
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ent in (semi-)peripheral Member States, especially in Romania, Poland, 
Latvia, Italy and Greece.85
The European Environment Agency’s report also shows links be-
tween the exposure to particulate matter and premature deaths and 
years of life lost: although in absolute numbers the estimates show that 
Member States with the largest populations suffer the most, in relative 
(per capita) terms there seems to be a gap between the EU centre and 
periphery, at the expense of the latter.86
Fifth, institutional resources. In the EU, decisions are made by the 
‘legislative triangle’, (most often) acting in the so-called ‘ordinary leg-
islative procedure’: the European Commission initiates draft laws that 
are deliberated and adopted jointly by the Council of the EU (Council of 
Ministers) and the European Parliament. Since the European Commis-
sion (ideally) represents the interests of the Union and is composed of 
independent members, distribution of political power between the Mem-
ber States mostly depends on the institutional setup of the Council (the 
US analogue would be the Senate) and the Parliament (the US analogue 
would be the House).
In the Council, every Member State is formally equal: it is represent-
ed by a single minister and has a single vote. However, a decision is ad-
opted if it satisfi es the ‘double majority’ requirement: a majority of Mem-
ber States (55%) representing a majority of the EU population (65%).87 
To satisfy the fi rst criterion, sixteen out of twenty-eight Member States 
would have to vote in favour of a proposal. This means that peripheral 
Member States (thirteen of them), if joined in a bloc, can prevent a pro-
posal from being adopted. However, if even the smallest Member State of 
the EU periphery switched sides, the proposal would pass since Member 
States of the centre strongly dominate the second criterion (total of the 
EU population represented). On the fl ip side, controlling the criterion of 
85  ibid, 53: ‘Concentrations of benzene (C6H6) in 2016’.
86  ibid, 63: ‘For PM2.5 [particulate matter with a diameter of 2.5 μm or less], the highest 
numbers of premature deaths and [years of life lost] are estimated for the countries with 
the largest populations (Germany, Italy, Poland, France and the United Kingdom). However, 
in relative terms, when considering [years of life lost] per 100,000 inhabitants, the largest 
impacts are observed in central and eastern European countries where the highest con-
centrations are also observed, ie Kosovo, Bulgaria, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, and Hungary. The lowest relative impacts are found in the countries at the 
northern and north-western edges of Europe: Iceland, Norway, Ireland, Sweden and Fin-
land.’ See also World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2017: Monitoring Health 
for the SDGs, available at <www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2017/
en/> accessed 29 October 2019 (documenting the highest (i) levels of air contamination 
in the cities and (ii) death rates attributed to air pollution in Europe in the countries of 
South-Eastern and Eastern Europe).
87  Council of the EU, Voting System − Voting Calculator, available at <www.consilium.euro-
pa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/> accessed 29 October 2019.
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the total EU population enables a couple of core Member States to veto 
any proposal. For instance, if all eighteen peripheral and semi-peripher-
al Member States agreed on a proposal, they would still fall short of sat-
isfying the population criterion since they cover only slightly over 45% 
of the total EU population. The voting system in the Council thus allows 
three of the most populous core Member States (Germany, France and 
the UK) plus any other fourth (a total of four votes are needed to form a 
blocking minority) to block any proposal.
In the EU Parliament, Member States are represented by direct-
ly elected national representatives. The apportionment of seats favours 
the smaller Member States (including those of the EU periphery) whose 
populations are thus overrepresented in the Parliament. However, the in-
ternal working procedures strongly favour the Member States of the EU 
centre, who then effectively control agenda setting. In many parliamen-
tary bodies through which a lot of work is done, Member States of the EU 
periphery are underrepresented.88 The key posts in the Parliament that 
have a strong infl uence over parliamentary proceedings − the vice-presi-
dents of the Parliament, the presidents of the parliamentary committees, 
the vice-presidents of the committees, the committee coordinators − are 
predominantly held by representatives from the EU centre.89 For illustra-
tion, the distribution of the posts of committee coordinators remarkably 
privileges the EU centre:
[O]n important dossiers, the ‘old’ member countries have dominant po-
sitions, especially in terms of committee coordinators. […] [T]hey are 
the ‘traffi c controllers’ of political groups, they distribute the roles of 
their deputies within the committees, in particular to steer the parlia-
mentary reports and negotiations on amendments. 33 of 189 coordi-
nators of this legislature are German, 21 French, 18 Italian, 16 British 
and 13 Spanish or Dutch.90
Moreover, due to the voter turnout in European elections, the Parlia-
ment is less representative of voters from the EU periphery.91
88  Eric Maurice and others, ‘Bilan de la 8ème législature du Parlement européen [Review 
of the 8th Legislature of the European Parliament]’ (2019) Fondation Robert Schuman Poli-
cy Paper, Question d’Europe, No. 512, available at <www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/ques-
tions-d-europe/qe-512-fr.pdf> accessed 29 October 2019.
89  ibid, 8: From a total of 440 top positions in the Parliament, Germany holds 74, France 
44, and Italy 42. At the bottom end are Latvia with 1, Cyprus 1, Slovenia 2, Lithuania 3, 
Estonia 3, Croatia 3, Ireland 4, Luxembourg 4, Slovakia 6, and Greece 6.
90  Georgi Gotev, ‘Report: Some Countries Clearly Under-represented in Outgoing European 
Parliament’  (EURACTIV, 24 April 2019) available at <www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elec-
tions-2019/news/report-some-countries-clearly-under-represented-in-outgoing-europe-
an-parliament/> accessed 29 October 2019.
91  The lowest turnout for the elections in 2014 was in Member States of the EU periphery: 
Slovakia 13%, Czech Republic 18%, Poland 23%, Slovenia 24%, Croatia 25%, Hungary 
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Going back to the issue of environmental justice: the structural in-
equalities reviewed in this section − in environmental responsibility and 
burdens, and in institutional power − suggest the existence of a stark 
divide between the EU centre and periphery in the distributive dimen-
sion. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of examples of the unequal 
distribution of environmental and political ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ between 
the Member States − many others, most certainly, could be encountered 
− but rather the most indicative instances of the existing injustices, as 
usually observed in the relevant literature. I refl ect later in the paper on 
the possible ways to address this distributive environmental injustice 
among the EU countries.
3.2 Procedural and corrective injustice 
As hinted in the very fi rst paragraph of the paper, the procedural 
and corrective dimensions of environmental justice are what is usual-
ly understood as ‘environmental justice’ in the EU. Of particular im-
portance in this context is the Aarhus Convention.92 This international 
treaty establishes the so-called ‘three pillars of environmental democra-
cy’: the right of access to environmental information, the right of public 
participation in environmental decision-making, and the right of access 
to justice in environmental matters. These three rights are seen as inter-
dependent and mutually reinforcing: access to information is thus a nec-
essary prerequisite for meaningful participation, while access to justice 
is a means to enforce the other two rights.
The Aarhus Convention in the EU is usually celebrated as a success 
story. The EU institutions adopted a range of regulations and directives 
to implement the Convention’s provisions, applicable to both the Mem-
ber States and the EU itself. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) fol-
29%, Latvia 30%, Romania 32%. The EU average was 42%. See European Parliament, Vot-
ers Turnout − 2014 European Elections (Results by Country), available at <www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/previous-elections> accessed 29 October 2019. 
A similar pattern emerged in the 2004 and 2009 elections. Although, in general, voter turn-
out has been in decline for national parliamentary elections across Europe, the decline for 
European elections has been even greater. See Perišin and Koplewicz (n 21) XX-XXI, who 
conclude that ‘while we see a general move away from engagement with governments, at 
the EU level this is more severe’. The latest 2019 European elections saw a rise in overall 
voter turnout (51% at the EU level). However, per Member State, there is a lower but still 
identifi able centre-periphery gap, with the lowest turnout recorded in Slovakia (22%), Slove-
nia (28%), Czech Republic (28%), Croatia (29%), Bulgaria (30%), Portugal (31%) and Latvia 
(33%). See European Parliament, 2019 European Election Results, available at <https://
election-results.eu/turnout/> accessed 29 October 2019.
92  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) − Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmen-
tal Matters (adopted on 25 June 1998 in Aarhus), available at <www.unece.org/fi leadmin/
DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf> accessed 29 October 2019.
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lowed with a progressive case law, for instance: by granting broad legal 
standing for environmental NGOs and ensuring that the public has wide 
access to justice;93 by recognising certain substantive rights for individ-
uals and NGOs stemming from EU secondary legislation;94 by imposing 
the obligation on Member States’ courts to interpret national law im-
plementing EU environmental law ‘to the fullest extent possible’ consis-
tently with the objectives of the Aarhus Convention;95 or by interpreting 
broadly the requirement that the costs of judicial proceedings must not 
be prohibitively expensive in order to safeguard the right to effective rem-
edy in environmental matters.96
However, despite many positive developments, there are equally 
many shortcomings in the Aarhus framework that impact environmen-
tal justice in the EU, both at the level of individual Member States and at 
the supranational level between different Member States.97 Many of these 
shortcomings are embedded in the Convention’s historical origins. There 
is an inherent ‘normative mismatch’ in the structure of the Aarhus re-
gime of environmental democracy: it tries to accommodate and balance 
manifold diverging interests, including democratisation, openness and 
transparency in environmental matters on the one hand, and the neo-
liberal-capitalist model of economic development with the protection of 
private commercial and market interests on the other.98 This is refl ected, 
93  Case C-263/08 Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening ECLI:EU:C:2009:631; 
Case C-115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhe-
in-Westfalen ECLI:EU:C:2011:289.
94  Case C-237/07 Dieter Janecek v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2008:447 (recognising the 
right of private parties whose health is impaired to have an action plan on ambient air qual-
ity drawn up by public authorities); Joined Cases C-165/09 to C-167/09 Stichting Natuur 
en Milieu and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:348.
95  Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (Slovak Bears) ECLI:EU:C:2011:125.
96  Case C-427/07 Commission v Ireland ECLI:EU:C:2009:457; Case C-260/11 David 
Edwards and Lilian Pallikaropoulos v Environment Agency ECLI:EU:C:2013:221; Case 
C-530/11 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2014:67.
97  Most notable are obstacles to access national courts, gaps in national implementation 
of EU environmental laws and policies, problems in realising the Aarhus rights in practice 
in the EU and in Member States, etc. See Commission, ‘Commission Notice on Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters’ Communication C(2017) 2616 fi nal 5-6: ‘Individuals and 
NGOs are adversely affected by obstacles to access to national courts. […] The most press-
ing implementation gaps across EU Member States are found in the policy fi elds of waste 
management, nature and biodiversity, air quality, and water quality and management’. See 
also Commission, ‘The EU Environmental Implementation Review: Common Challenges 
and How to Combine Efforts to Deliver Better Results’ Communication COM(2017) 63 fi nal, 
which, indicatively, does not explicitly tackle or elaborate possible environmental or so-
cial justice issues but does emphasise that ‘[w]eak implementation generates high societal, 
economic and environmental costs and it creates an uneven playing fi eld for businesses’ 2 
(emphasis added).
98  Michael Mason, ‘Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights: The Aarhus Conven-
tion’ (2010) 10(3) Global Environmental Politics 10.
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for instance, in more stringent requirements for public access to environ-
mental information in EU law than is prescribed in the Aarhus Conven-
tion, and consequently more protection granted for economic interests,99 
or ‘the tendency of EU institutions to shield corporate actors from Aar-
hus responsibilities’100 at the expense of the protection of the public good. 
Furthermore, Aarhus’s three pillars of environmental democracy 
assume that all Member States, albeit ‘separate’ (as sovereign countries), 
are ‘equal’ in relevant aspects, and thus envisage one-size-fi ts-all rules 
and standards. The formalism of this approach disregards a couple of 
things that may be observed through the existing centre-periphery di-
vide in the EU.
The fi rst asymmetry concerns the procedural dimension of envi-
ronmental justice and encompasses several issues. The infl uence of big 
businesses with homogenous, concentrated interests on environmental 
decision-making is disproportionate in comparison to larger, hetero-
geneous groups (civil society, environmental NGOs) with diffuse inter-
ests.101 As the EU ‘crits’ have suggested, the interests  of companies and 
industries from the EU centre are overrepresented in EU decision-mak-
ing, both formally (through the structural bias of the EU internal market 
in their favour, and the EU’s institutional framework more generally) 
and informally (through lobbying and greater representation in the EU 
centres of power), whereas EU peripheral states are in many respects 
underrepresented in the EU institutional framework.
One peculiar characteristic of environmental law is the dependence 
of its enforcement on private actors.102 There is a lack of fi nancial incen-
99  See, generally, Peter Oliver, ‘Access to Information and to Justice in EU Environmental 
Law: The Aarhus Convention’ (2013) 36(5) Fordham International Law Journal 1423. Other 
discrepancies between the Aarhus and the EU frameworks include an additional exception 
for denying access to environmental information (‘the protection of […] the fi nancial, mon-
etary or economic policy of the EU or a Member State’), see Article 4(1)a of Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents; and omitting 
in Article 4(2) of the same Regulation the Aarhus Convention’s requirement that the ‘confi -
dentiality of commercial and industrial information is protected by law, in order to protect a 
legitimate economic interest’ (emphasis added), before access to environmental information 
in order to protect the ‘commercial interests of a natural or legal person’ can be denied.
100  Michael Mason, ‘So Far but No Further? Transparency and Disclosure in the Aarhus 
Convention’ in Aarti Gupta and Michael Mason (eds), Transparency in Global Environmental 
Governance: Critical Perspectives (MIT Press 2014) 97.
101  In general on the theory of public goods, interest groups and collective action, see the sem-
inal works of American political economist Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard University Press 1965) and The Rise and Decline of 
Nations: Economic Growth, Stagfl ation, and Social Rigidities (Yale University Press 1982).
102  Ludwig Krämer, ‘The Environmental Complaint in EU Law’ (2009) 6(1) Journal for Eu-
ropean Environmental and Planning Law 13: ‘Strong environmental groups which could 
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tives for individuals and economic operators to comply with or pursue 
enforcement of the EU environmental regulation, unlike in other reg-
ulatory areas such as the internal market or antitrust.103 This directly 
affects the quality of the system of monitoring the application of envi-
ronmental laws in the EU, with Member States of the periphery facing 
greater diffi culties due to lack of compliance and engagement by private 
actors. As Krämer notes:   
Little attention is granted, until today, to the practical organization 
of monitoring the application of environmental law. In Germany, the 
Länder execute federal environmental legislation as matters of their 
own. There is no mechanism to monitor, whether this execution is prop-
erly done, and there is, in practice, no mechanism to call a Land to order 
when federal environmental legislation is not fully complied with. This 
approach is based on the concept that citizens and economic operators 
will follow the rule of law, once it is expressed in the form of legislation. 
The situation in many EU Member States − one may quote Greece, Ita-
ly, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and more or less all of the twelve Member 
States which joined the European Union since 2004 − is different.104
Apart from the quality of the civil and business sector, another is-
sue relevant in this context is the level of citizens’ engagement in public 
and environmental matters, which differs between the EU centre and 
periphery. Reports on the share of active citizens105 in the total popu-
lation of EU Member States seem to disclose a gap between the centre 
and the periphery.106 There is a similar centre-periphery divide regarding 
citizen participation in formal voluntary activities.107 This gap in active 
contribute to the effective application of [EU] environmental law, lack; this feature makes 
the environmental sector different from most other economic or social sectors, where strong 
interests − professional bodies, trade unions, competitors, trade and industry associations, 
farmers’ associations − promote the defense of their respective interests. All the more is the 
environment dependent on the commitment of the civil society to preserve and protect it’.
103  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters’ 
COM(2003) 624 fi nal.
104  Krämer (n 102) 13.
105  Eurostat (n 79) 111: ‘Active citizenship describes people who decide to get involved in 
democracy at all levels, from local communities, through towns and cities to nationwide 
activities. Indeed, participative democracy requires people to get involved and to play an 
active role in political organisations or supporting various causes with a commitment to 
improve the welfare of society’.
106  ibid, 112: ‘Across the EU Member States, the share of active citizens peaked in 2015 in 
France (24.6%), followed by Sweden (22.1%), the Netherlands (17.8%) and Finland (17.0%) 
[…] At the other end of the range, less than 5.0% of the population in 2015 were active cit-
izens in Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus 
− which had the lowest proportion (2.1%)’.
107  ibid, 118-119: ‘There were nine Member States where fewer than 1 in 10 adults partic-
ipated in formal voluntary activities in 2015 − they were principally located in eastern and 
southern Europe, with the lowest share recorded in Romania (3.2%)’.
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citizenship closely follows the income gap,108 so the centre-periphery di-
vide here should perhaps not come as a great surprise. Moreover, since 
in the majority of Member States ‘the cost of the judicial procedures is 
considered to be an obstacle to environmental justice − or at least to have 
a dissuasive effect thereupon’,109 the existing income gap will arguably 
affect the exercise of the Aarhus right to access courts differently in the 
EU centre and periphery.
Furthermore, the type of main problems that communities in differ-
ent Member States bear reveals different environmental harms faced by 
the EU centre and periphery. This was one of the indicators of environmen-
tal injustice in the US identifi ed by Professor Paul Mohai: he noted how 
responses to the question of the most important environmental problem 
in the USA vary between white and black respondents, where the former 
group singled out overconsumption of natural resources while the latter 
group identifi ed pollution.110 Similarly in the EU, respondents from the 
core Member States predominantly identify climate change as the most 
important environmental issue they face, whereas respondents from the 
EU periphery almost always single out air pollution and waste.111 Another 
similar, almost perfect, centre-periphery divide in responses was recorded 
for citizen attitudes concerning the global importance of climate change.112 
108  ibid, 115: ‘[A]n analysis of active citizenship by income quintile […] reveals that a larger 
proportion of people with higher incomes were active citizens’.
109  Jan Därpö, ‘Effective Justice? Synthesis of the Report of the Study on the Implementation 
of Articles 9.3 and 9.4 of the Aarhus Convention in the Member States of the European Union’ 
2013-10-11/Final (2013) available at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/pdf/syn-
thesis%20report%20on%20access%20to%20justice.pdf> accessed 30 October 2019. 
110  Bill Kubota, ‘Fighting for Air in Southwest Detroit’ (Detroit Journalism Cooperative, 6 De-
cember 2017) available at <www.detroitjournalism.org/2017/12/08/fi ghting-air-48217/> 
accessed 30 October 2019 (Paul Mohai appears in the video at 8:10).
111  Special Eurobarometer 468, Attitudes of European Citizens towards the Environment 
(Summary, October 2017) 6: ‘In 11 Member States, climate change is ranked as the most 
important environmental issue, while air pollution is most frequently chosen as an import-
ant issue in eight countries; in France, an equal proportion of respondents choose these 
two issues. In seven countries, the growing amount of waste is considered as the most 
important environmental issue, while in one country (Portugal) agricultural pollution and 
soil degradation is the most frequently-chosen issue’. Among available responses, ‘climate 
change’ is selected by respondents in eight states of the centre, two semi-peripheral and 
one peripheral Member State (Cyprus); ‘air pollution’ by respondents in six states from the 
periphery, two semi-peripheral and a single core Member State (Belgium); ‘growing amount 
of waste’ by respondents in seven states from the periphery.
112  Special Eurobarometer 459, Climate Change (March 2017) 7-8 and 12: The question 
was about ‘climate change as the single most serious problem facing the world’; the results 
showed that ‘[i]n three Member States, at least a quarter of respondents say that climate 
change is the most serious problem: Sweden (38%), Denmark (29%) and the Netherlands 
(27%). At the other end of the scale, fewer than one in ten respondents consider it to be the 
most serious problem in 13 Member States, with the lowest scores in Portugal and Greece 
(both 4%) and the Czech Republic and Poland (both 6%)’.
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These data and indicators, showing different levels of public partic-
ipation and different attitudes toward the most pressing environmental 
problems between the EU centre and periphery, hint at some environ-
mental justice issues between the two groups of EU countries. Therefore, 
EU procedural environmental laws implementing the Aarhus Conven-
tion’s fi rst two pillars (concerning access to environmental information 
and public engagement in environmental matters), when assuming for-
mal equality between the Member States, fail to consider the existing 
differences. Hence, this procedural dimension falls short of ensuring 
substantive environmental justice for citizens of the EU periphery.
The second asymmetry concerns the corrective dimension of envi-
ronmental justice. Most importantly, in access to justice, ‘regulated en-
tities’ − and, to reiterate, EU legal and market structures privilege com-
panies and businesses from the centre − have more access to review acts 
of the EU institutions than ‘regulatory benefi ciaries’, that is, citizens and 
environmental NGOs. Here, especially problematic is the CJEU’s narrow 
interpretation of standing to challenge decisions of the EU institutions. 
Unlike in other policy areas where it is considered to have progressive-
ly protected different ‘oppressed’ groups and individuals by expanding 
and ensuring enforcement of their rights,113 in environmental matters 
it adopts a strikingly different, incomprehensibly regressive approach. 
More specifi cally, the Plaumann test,114 devised long ago by the Court to 
regulate who gets to access EU courts to challenge EU acts, has virtually 
barred environmental NGOs from standing.115 This test requires from
113  Perišin (n 39) 166: ‘The Court of Justice has played a pivotal role in granting rights to 
the “oppressed”. Through its case law, it has developed a number of individual rights such 
as non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, gender, age, disability (including obe-
sity), etc. Furthermore, the Court’s constructs of direct effect, supremacy, interpretative ef-
fect and some other characteristics of EU law have contributed to the actual enforcement of 
rights’ (footnotes omitted). In addition, ‘[i]n synergy with the ideology of European integra-
tion, the Court has taken a number of progressive steps and has pioneered the protection 
of many individual and group rights. Some groups still perceive themselves as outsiders or 
indeed are outsiders to European integration, so there is still work to be done, and to some 
extent this work can be done by the Court’ (174).
114  Case 25-62 Plaumann & Co v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1963:17. Case T-585/93 Stichting 
Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission ECLI:EU:T:1995:147, 
paras 50-60, confi rmed that Plaumann ‘remains applicable whatever the nature, economic or 
otherwise, of those of the applicants’ interests which are affected’ (reiterated in Joined Cases 
T-236/04 and T-241/04 European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2005:426). In the post-Aarhus era, the inability for environmental 
interests to ground legal standing was reasserted in Case T-91/07 WWF-UK Ltd v Council 
ECLI:EU:T:2008:170, para 82: ‘[A]ny entitlements which the applicant may derive from the 
Aarhus Convention and from Regulation No 1367/2006 are granted to it in its capacity as 
a member of the public. Such entitlements cannot therefore be such as to differentiate the 
applicant from all other persons within the meaning of the [existing] case law’.
115  Mariolina Eliantonio, ‘Towards an Ever Dirtier Europe? The Restrictive Standing of 
Environmental NGOs Before the European Courts and the Aarhus Convention’ (2011) 7 
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claimants […] to demonstrate that they were ‘directly’ and ‘individually’ 
concerned with the challenged act, conditions that were never fulfi lled 
in cases related to enforcement of environmental law. […] [O]ne could 
note that the Plaumann test is shaped according to traditional individual 
rights and personal interests. By contrast, environmental cases are in-
herently underpinned by public interest and support the preservation of 
common goods.116
This judicially constructed test and ‘the prerequisite of individual-
ity’ thus introduced, De Sadeleer and Poncelet stress, ‘had a chilling ef-
fect on potential applicants seeking to challenge acts of Union law which 
had an impact on the quality of the environment’.117 Unfortunately, any 
change in judicial doctrine regarding the standing of ‘regulatory bene-
fi ciaries’ to challenge the legality of EU environmental laws seems rath-
er unlikely. The Court appears rather unenthusiastic about the Aarhus 
Convention’s application in relation to the EU institutions as compared 
to the Member States’ institutions,118 or allowing public engagement to 
protect the environment as opposed to economic interests.119
In the meantime, as a matter of international law, with the CJEU’s 
restrictive treatment of legal standing, the Union, a self-proclaimed glob-
al champion of the rule of law, remains in violation of the Aarhus Conven-
tion’s requirements on access to justice.120 This ‘inconvenient truth’ was 
Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 84: ‘By applying the restrictive Plaumann 
test to the actions brought by environmental NGOs, the European courts have, to date, sig-
nifi cantly curtailed access to justice to challenge EU measures affecting the environment. 
In fact, in none of the cases brought at the European level have environmental NGOs ever 
been granted standing’.
116  Nicolas De Sadeleer and Charles Poncelet, ‘Protection Against Acts Harmful to Human 
Health and the Environment Adopted by the EU Institutions’ (2012) 14 Cambridge Year-
book of EU Law 179-180 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
117  ibid, 179. 
118  Laurens Ankersmit and Benedikt Pirker, ‘Review of EU Legislation under EU Inter-
national Agreements Revisited: Aarhus Receives another Blow’ (European Law Blog, 17 
November 2015) available at <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2015/11/17/review-of-eu-leg-
islation-under-eu-international-agreements-revisited-aarhus-receives-another-blow/> ac-
cessed 30 October 2019 (‘The conclusion one has to draw at this point is that the Court is to 
quite some extent dissatisfi ed with the drafting of the Aarhus Convention, and expresses it 
through its reticence to give effect to its provisions whenever the EU institutions are poten-
tially at risk. However, such selective binding effect of the Convention is hardly dogmatically 
tenable. Does the Court have a legitimate reason to differentiate between the obligations 
resulting from the Convention for the Member States and those for the EU?’).
119  Ludwig Krämer, ‘Access to Environmental Justice: The Double Standards of the ECJ’ 
(2017) 14(2) Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law (demonstrating that 
the CJEU ‘is much stricter with regard to the admissibility of actions which try to protect 
the environment’ than regarding actions brought by industry and businesses when their 
economic and fi nancial interests are at stake).
120  Charles Poncelet, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters: Does the European 
Union Comply with its Obligations?’ (2012) 24(2) Journal of Environmental Law 287 (ques-
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recently confi rmed by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.121 
Internally − rather ‘paradoxically’ and ‘perversely’122 − there is even less 
room for individuals and NGOs from both the EU’s centre and periphery 
to hold the EU institutions legally accountable for their actions affecting 
the environment.123 As a consequence, ‘there is a strong possibility that 
[environmental] measures taken by the EU authorities were enforced in 
spite of their potential unlawfulness. This in turn may affect the quality 
of the environment’.124
Another issue impairing corrective environmental justice in the EU 
concerns the effi ciency of national justice systems. The vast majority of 
EU laws are enforced and administered in a decentralised manner, that 
is, by the Member States. In the EU, this is known as ‘executive federal-
ism’.125 Unlike law-making powers, the Union lacks comprehensive exec-
tioning ‘whether the EU legal system complies with the letter and the spirit of the Aarhus 
Convention’); Benedikt Pirker, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and the Aarhus 
Convention’s Effects in the EU Legal Order: No Room for Nuanced Self-executing Effect?’ 
(2016) 25(1) Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 81 
(criticising ‘the Court’s overtly rigid jurisprudence’ due to which the Aarhus Convention 
‘cannot serve as a benchmark to review the very same Convention’s implementing measure 
at EU level, the Aarhus Regulation’).
121  Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, Findings and recommendations of the com-
pliance committee with regard to communication ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part II) concerning 
compliance by the European Union, adopted by the Compliance Committee on 17 March 
2017, available at <www.unece.org/fi leadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-32/Find-
ings/C32_EU_Findings_as_adopted_advance_unedited_version.pdf> accessed 30 Octo-
ber 2019. For a commentary, see Benedikt Pirker, ‘Implementation of the Aarhus Con-
vention by the EU: An  Inconvenient Truth from the Compliance Committee’ (European 
Law Blog, 24 April 2017) available at <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/04/24/imple-
mentation-of-the-aarhus-convention-by-the-eu-an-inconvenient-truth-from-the-compli-
ance-committee/> accessed 30 October 2019.
122  Eliantonio (n 115) 76: ‘[T]he European Courts have interpreted the individual concern 
criterion so narrowly (and, one could argue, somewhat paradoxically) that environmental 
NGOs have in every case been refused standing to challenge EU institutions’ decisions, ex-
empting essentially these decisions from judicial scrutiny. […] The application of the Plau-
mann test to environmental measures has the perverse effect that the higher the number 
of individuals affected by EU measures (and hence, one could argue, the more potentially 
dangerous the EU measure is), the less chance there will be that standing will be granted’.
123  De Sadeleer and Poncelet (n 116) 183: ‘In essence, most environmental measures do 
not create situations that are “peculiar” to anyone within the meaning of the Plaumann 
doctrine. In fact, the condition of individuality as construed by the Court was virtually 
impossible to fulfi l. In other words, environmental measures were immune from judicial 
review initiated by individuals’.
124  ibid.
125  Koen Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38(2) Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law 230-233; Robert Schütze, ‘From Rome To Lisbon: “Executive 
Federalism” in the (New) European Union’ (2010) 47(5) Common Market Law Review 1385-
1386: ‘The Union must therefore extensively rely on the Member States to administer federal 
law. […] [T]he Union’s executive powers are co-extensive with its legislative powers; yet, the 
Union’s executive powers are only subsidiary to the Member States’ powers’.
245CYELP 15 [2019] 215-267
utive powers. Therefore, between the citizens and EU environmental laws 
stand national public authorities. Their acts and decisions implementing 
EU environmental laws are then reviewable before national courts.
However, in the area of environmental procedural rights, Member 
States have so far opposed, due to subsidiarity issues, the adoption of a 
Directive on access to justice in environmental matters that would im-
plement the Aarhus Convention’s third pillar uniformly in national legal 
systems.126 Hence, differences in Member States regarding the adminis-
tration and judicial enforcement of EU laws impact environmental justice 
in different parts of the EU. This was similarly recognised by Harper, 
Steger and Filcak when they noted that 
The EU provides an emerging framework for the promotion of environ-
mental protection, human rights and health. […] Serious EU efforts in 
these realms, however, will require an elaborated regulatory framework 
that specifically targets environmental justice. Furthermore, asserting 
a framework for such important measures does not always guarantee 
implementation, which can be challenging for new member states due 
to various constraints, including economic and administrative barriers.127
Almost as a rule, Member States of the centre have greater admin-
istrative capacities128 and enjoy on average a more effi cient, quality and 
independent judiciary compared to the EU periphery.129 Illustratively, the 
‘quality of government’ index that combines variables such as corrup-
tion, impartiality, quality of public services and the rule of law recently 
showed that there still exist wide regional differences in the quality of 
government between the Western and Northern EU Member States on 
the one hand and the Eastern and Southern ones on the other.130
So, here we reach a similar conclusion as that concerning the dis-
tributive inequalities in environmental matters discussed earlier: with-
out substantive requirements for environmental justice that would take 
126  Krämer (n 102) 17.
127  Harper, Steger and Filcak (n 36) 256 (emphasis added, references omitted).
128  Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, ‘Quality of Government in EU Regions: Spa-
tial and Temporal Patterns’ (2018) QOG The Quality of Government Institute University of 
Gothenburg, Working Paper Series 2018:2, available at <https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAs-
sets/1679/1679869_2018_1_charron_lapuente.pdf> accessed 30 October 2019.
129  Commission, ‘2018 EU Justice Scoreboard with Factsheets. Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’ COM(2018) 
364 fi nal, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-eu-justice-score-
board_en> accessed 30 October 2019.
130  Charron and Lapuente (n 128); see also Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra and Victor 
Lapuente, ‘Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union 
Member States’ (2014) 48(1) Regional Studies 68.
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into account  the centre-periphery divide in the EU as presented in this 
part, the other two dimensions ( procedural and corrective) will be dif-
ferently (in)effective in different parts of the EU, with the EU periphery 
being comparatively worse off in many respects than the EU centre. Due 
to its formalistic approach, then, the Aarhus regime as implemented in 
the EU fails to address appropriately existing distributive environmental 
injustice. Of course, the comparative lack of civic engagement or compli-
ance by private actors in the periphery, or for that matter a less effi cient 
administration and judiciary in the EU periphery, is not in and of itself 
unjust. However, the procedural and corrective avenues for remedying 
the existing environmental inequalities failing to take into account the 
EU centre-periphery gap in their operation in effect forecloses the EU pe-
riphery’s ‘aspirations and claims for protection against [environmental] 
harm’.131 And this is what is unjust.
Could the EU legal instruments somehow be  adapted to address en-
vironmental injustice (in all three dimensions) among the EU countries, 
that is, make a ‘shift’ from formal to substantive equality? I return to 
this question in Section 5. But fi rst, a word on the possible explanation 
of the causes of environmental injustice in the EU.
4 What kind of environmental injustice is there in the EU centre-
periphery gap?
 In this part, I will try to conceptualise further the environmental 
injustice identifi ed and linked to the centre-periphery divide in the EU. 
At fi rst, it would seem clear that if the arguments offered in the previous 
section were to be accepted, the dominant explanation for the recognised 
environmental injustice would be socio-economic factors (hence, envi-
ronmental classism) and not racial factors (or environmental racism) as 
in the US.132 In other words, explaining environmental injustice between 
different Member States would need to focus primarily on the inequali-
ties in economic development and wealth. But this, in my view, does not 
completely foreclose factors other than socio-economic ones as a sup-
porting explanation of the causes of environmental injustice in the EU, 
as proposed in this paper. Let me unpack this.
First, we need to go back to other American intellectual movements 
that in many ways followed the CLS movement mentioned in the opening 
131  Kukovec (n 37).
132  Similarly, Laurent (n 13) 1849: ‘[E]nvironmental justice issues are not likely in Europe 
to be perceived, analyzed and framed in racial and ethnic terms but in terms of social cate-
gories. It should not be understood as meaning that environmental inequalities do not have 
a racial dimension in Europe (they of course do, like all social inequalities in racially diverse 
societies […])’ (emphasis added).
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part and added a distinctive layer to its critique of legal formalism. Here 
I have in mind the identity critique of law offered by the Critical Race 
Theory (CRT) and feminist legal theory, both providing useful analyti-
cal tools for examining the role of law in establishing and perpetuating 
societal hierarchies. These critical theories to a large extent refl ected 
Antonio Gramsci’s ideas of legal hegemony and law’s legitimation of ex-
ploitations and oppressions: Gramsci saw
hegemony [as] the permeation throughout civil society […] of an entire 
system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or 
another supportive of the established order and the class interests that 
dominate it. […] To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is in-
ternalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of ‘common sense’. […] 
[H]egemony work[s] in many ways to induce the oppressed to accept or 
‘consent’ to their own exploitation and daily misery.133
In this fashion, the CRT criticised ahistorical and decontextualized 
legal narratives.134 It ‘examined the role of liberal-capitalist ideology in 
maintaining an unjust racial status quo’ and aimed to deconstruct ‘tra-
ditional interests and values [that] serve as vessels of racial subordina-
tion’.135 Similarly to their CLS counterparts, CRT scholars were funda-
mentally suspicious about ‘dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectiv-
ity, color blindness, and meritocracy’.136 They especially questioned ‘the 
basic legitimacy of the free market’ that is alleged to operate ‘fairly and 
impartially’.137 (That the CRT indeed intersects with the environmental 
133  See Gottlieb, Bix, Lytton and West (n 16) 632, quoting Edward Greer, ‘Antonio Gramsci 
and Legal Hegemony’ in David Kairys (ed) The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (Third 
Edition, Basic Books 1998) 304-309 (emphasis added).
134  See Charles R Lawrence III, Mari J Matsuda, Richard Delgado and Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, ‘Introduction’ in Mari J Matsuda, Charles R Lawrence III, Richard Delgado and 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (eds), Words That Wound. Critical Race Theory, Assaultive 
Speech, and the First Amendment (First Edition, Routledge 1993) 1-15, for an explanation 
of what the Critical Race Theory is.
135  ibid, 5-6.
136  ibid, 6.
137  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law’ (1988) 101(7) Harvard Law Review 1380: ‘Race con-
sciousness also reinforces whites’ sense that  American society is really meritocratic and 
thus helps prevent them from questioning the basic legitimacy of the free market. Believing 
both that Blacks are inferior and that the economy impartially rewards the superior over the 
inferior, whites see that most Blacks are indeed worse off than whites are, which reinforces 
their sense that the market is operating “fairly and impartially”; those who should logically 
be on the bottom are on the bottom. This strengthening of whites’ belief in the system in turn 
reinforces their beliefs that Blacks are indeed inferior. After all, equal opportunity is the 
rule, and the market is an impartial judge; if Blacks are on the bottom, it must refl ect their 
relative inferiority. Racist ideology thus operates in conjunction with the class components of 
legal ideology to reinforce the status quo, both in terms of class and race’ (emphasis added, 
footnotes omitted).
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justice movement, as I believe it does, one is lead to think after reading 
works of scholars like Richard Delgado and Carmen Gonzalez.)
Moreover, feminist legal scholars added to the CRT’s critique of law 
the following dilemma that I fi nd particularly instructive for my later 
proposition: is ethnicity to race what gender is to sex, meaning a para-
digm social construct (former) to a (putatively) biological category (lat-
ter)?138 Are the two (ethnicity and race) easily severed after all? 
I wonder whether any kind of arguments along these lines could be 
made when discussing the EU centre-periphery divide (and not only in 
environmental matters, which is what concerns me the most here). After 
all, EU (environmental) law is most often ahistorical, decontextualised 
and technocratic.139 Could it have any role in, if not establishing, then 
perpetuating or legitimising the identifi ed injustice?
I suppose there could be several responses to this. Of those, one 
position would be to deny the existence of any environmental injustice 
between the EU centre and periphery. This basically rejects the very 
premises offered here, so any conclusion on the root causes or contempo-
rary drivers of that injustice would likewise have to be rejected. 
Another position would be to acknowledge the existence of some sort 
of environmental injustice, of some degree, at this level, which would at 
the same time fail to see any wrong of the EU structures in establishing 
or perpetuating that injustice. A proponent of this position would cling 
to the asserted ‘neutrality, objectivity, and meritocracy’ of the EU, its law 
and its institutional setup, and profess the ‘fair, unbiased and impar-
tial’ operation of the EU market. These narratives, if you recall, were at-
tacked convincingly by European critical legal scholars who unmasked 
the structural hierarchies and inequalities that lie behind the façade of 
such a market-centred ideology.
Yet another position would be to acknowledge the underlying injus-
tice but to take it as something inevitable, or, even more cynically, as 
something deserved. Perhaps this would be a marginal position that no 
one would ever adopt (at least not publicly), so I might be after a straw 
man with this one. But not necessarily. Indeed, there might be some who 
share the view of the ex-World Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers 
138   Remarks by Professor Catharine A MacKinnon, a leading contemporary feminist legal 
theorist and political philosopher, during a lecture at the University of Michigan Law School 
(March 2019). Compare with her textbook Sex Equality (Third Edition, West Academic Pub-
lishing 2016) 61 (fn 1): ‘This book uses the terms “race” and “ethnicity” interchangeably, as 
it is the social meaning of race, i.e. ethnicity, in social systems of inequality, that is under 
discussion’.
139  Similarly, Gonzalez (n 22) 84, claims that ‘the discourse of international environmental 
law is often ahistorical and technocratic’.
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about the economic logic behind having underdeveloped, under-polluted 
countries bearing the greater burden of environmental degradation.140 
So, in the EU context, one would have the peripheral Member States, 
being less developed and (historically) less polluted than the EU centre, 
with a greater share of (contemporary) environmental harms and bur-
dens (some of which were discussed in Section 3, such as a lower quality 
of ambient air, worse environmental and living conditions, or greater en-
ergy poverty and air pollution-related diseases and deaths). There could 
indeed be some economic logic behind this.
Or, the argument could be that, in ‘a meritocratic, fair and impar-
tial’ Union of equals, if the EU periphery is indeed inferior in  certain 
matters, it must be doing something wrong. ‘[T]hose who should logically 
be on the bottom are on the bottom’.141 This view, I believe, seems more 
present in the current discourse about the EU. It builds upon certain 
stereotypes, which come with prejudicial connotations, about Member 
States of the EU periphery. These stereotypes might operate as an en-
gine for entrenching hierarchies that European CLS scholars are writing 
about. Furthermore, these essentially ‘ethnic’ stereotypes are grounded 
in a set of false dichotomies that can be used to legitimise the underlying 
injustices and oppression. So, false dichotomies that exist about the EU 
periphery (and are often juxtaposed to the EU centre) include the follow-
ing characterisations of their citizens: easy-going vs serious; corrupted 
vs trustworthy, or lazy vs hard-working, or (fi nancially) reckless vs (fi -
nancially) responsible;142 xenophobic vs cosmopolitan;143 simpleminded 
vs open-minded and well-educated; etc. (Note here that the stereotyping 
is equal: it is present for both core and peripheral EU nations. But sub-
stantively, the resulting stereotypes are unequal: for the former they are 
positive or largely neutral, for the latter negative; the fi rst denote domi-
nance, the second submission).
Some of the false dichotomies, like Eastern European plumbers 
(manual labourers) vs Western European bankers (liberal professionals), 
have featured signifi cantly in recent major political events in the EU. For 
instance, the Polish plumber hysteria that was omnipresent in Western 
140  Jim Vallette, ‘Larry Summers’ War Against the Earth’ (CounterPunch, 15 June 1999): 
(‘[A] given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the country  with the low-
est cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind 
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face 
up to that’).
141  Crenshaw (n 137).
142  Here I have in mind narratives on the Greek sovereign debt crisis.
143  Here I have in mind narratives on the failure of the EU’s Dublin asylum regime due to 
the rejection of refugee allocation quotas by (most prominently) Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Member States.
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Europe and ultimately contributed to the failure of the proposed EU Con-
stitutional Treaty in national referendums in two ‘core’ Member States 
(France and the Netherlands) in 2005.144 As Böröcz and Sarkar further 
remarked: 
It would seem that the trope of the Polish Plumber played quite a his-
toric role in holding back the post ‘nation-state’ transformation of west-
ern Europe […] the increasingly demonized fi gure of the east-Europe-
an-worker dominated discursive space about labor policy, social rights, 
and eventually, European Union membership.145
Or, the UK’s 2016 referendum to leave the Union that was in part 
fuelled by the concerns about the immigration of cheap labour from the 
EU periphery.146 Comparing the two events, Ballinger argued that
The stock character of the ‘Polish plumber’ who has migrated to West-
ern Europe thanks to the policies of EU enlargement, for example, em-
bodies the fear of a displaced ‘Eastern Europe’ now lurking in the heart 
of France or the United Kingdom. Whereas in the mid-2000s French 
anxieties about Polish workers were mocked gently […] by the time of 
the 2016 Brexit vote the anxieties aroused by Polish plumbers had be-
come deadly serious.147
So, similarly, in explaining environmental injustice as depicted in 
this paper, the argument would be that ‘they [in the EU periphery] must 
be doing something wrong’ in environmental affairs: for instance − and 
here the stereotypes appear − they are bio-unfriendly, ecologically or en-
vironmentally ‘unconscious’ and ignorant, unaware of nature’s fragility, 
144  József Böröcz and Mahua Sarkar, ‘The Unbearable Whiteness of the Polish Plumber and 
the Hungarian Peacock Dance around “Race”’ (2017) 76(2) Slavic Review 309.
145  ibid, 309-311.
146  See Perišin (n 39) 155: ‘[Brexit voters] voted to leave the EU, believing that by blocking 
the inflow of other EU citizens, primarily those from Central and Eastern Europe, and by 
stopping the immigration of third-country nationals, they could regain some benefits that 
existed in a closed market’; Böröcz and Sarkar (n 144) 311: ‘The tone of the British [Brexit] 
conversation was considerably more ferocious than the French. The frequency of acts of 
physical violence against Poles increased dramatically’ (footnotes omitted); Vanessa Quick, 
‘Benefi cial immigration’ (The German Times, September 2007): ‘The Polish plumber has 
come to symbolize the Western Europeans’ fear of an invasion of cheap Eastern European 
labor threatening their jobs’; Elisabeth Braw, ‘“Brexit” debate: Could Britain get by without 
the “Polish Plumber”?’ (Christian Science Monitor, 25 February 2016) available at <www.
csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2016/0225/Brexit-debate-Could-Britain-get-by-without-
the-Polish-Plumber> accessed 30 October 2019 (‘Pro-Brexit campaigners blame Poles − and 
the tens of thousands of Romanians and Bulgarians who have joined them − for taking 
jobs and benefi ts from British workers. […] Much like Mexican and Central American im-
migrants in the United States, Poles are seen as taking primarily unskilled jobs away from 
working-class Britons. Even worse, many Britons feel, is the fact that many Poles send the 
child benefi t payments they receive here to their children in Poland’).
147  Ballinger (n 47) 45-46.
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they support environmentally harmful practices and lifestyles, they are 
not ‘green’ enough, etc.
I wonder whether environmental injustice lying in the EU centre-pe-
riphery gap could somehow be conceptualised along these lines. I under-
stand that a predominant driver of such injustice might still be socio-eco-
nomic factors (‘classism’). But, other drivers could nevertheless be instru-
mental in supporting this injustice. Perhaps it should not be regarded 
as pure ‘racism’ (as in the USA), so I would suggest understanding it at 
the supranational level, that is, the Union level, as ‘ethnicism’. In this 
context, the term ‘ethnicism’ would contain prejudicial connotations and 
the above-mentioned stereotypes about the Member States of the EU pe-
riphery. Indeed, racism and stereotypes have already been acknowledged 
as supporting and legitimising environmental injustice at the micro-level 
in Europe: Harper, Steger and Filcak thus held that ‘stereotypical repre-
sentations of the Roma come to justify their economic and spatial mar-
ginalization’.148 Therefore, I propose as one way of viewing environmental 
injustice between different EU Member States (at the macro-level) as a 
combination of environmental ‘classism’ and ‘ethnicism’. ‘[Ethnicist] ide-
ology thus operates in conjunction with the class components of legal ide-
ology to reinforce the status quo, both in terms of class and [ethnicity]’.149 
What would be the precise share of each intersecting phenomenon or their 
correlation in perpetuating or legitimising the environmental injustice in 
the EU is an open question; to go in either direction at this point, I admit, 
would be very speculative. However, since my main argument does not 
depend on resolving this, I leave the matter where it stands, satisfi ed with 
a preliminary attempt to conceptualise environmental injustice concealed 
in the EU centre-periphery divide in these terms.
To recapitulate at this point before moving on with the discussion: 
my argument (hardly spectacular or ground-breaking) is that: (i) the EU 
periphery is less responsible for historical and contemporary environ-
mental harms in Europe than the EU centre; (ii) the EU periphery bears 
a greater contemporary environmental burden and suffers greater envi-
ronmental harm than the EU centre; (iii) the current EU procedural and 
corrective framework is too formalistic to vindicate the EU periphery’s 
claim for substantive environmental justice; (iv) the EU periphery has less 
political power than the EU centre to infl uence Union decision-making 
to address the environmental injustice in any of the three (distributive, 
procedural, corrective) dimensions; (v) environmental injustice between 
the Member States of the EU centre and periphery may be explained as 
a combination of environmental ‘classism’ and ‘ethnicism’.
148  Harper, Steger and Filcak (n 36) 262.
149  Crenshaw (n 137).
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The concerned reader should not misread this:  my argument is not 
that any of this is consciously or intentionally caused by the Member 
States of the EU centre, or EU law itself. In this sense, the argument 
is not guilt-ascribing, but rather responsibility-ascribing, as elaborated 
in the following section. But, mind you: environmental injustices nowa-
days do not follow from ‘overt discriminatory animus’, but from ‘neutral 
decisions made within intrinsically biased’ (economic, political, social) 
structures and reality.150 However, the claim is that: (vi) if, for whatever 
reason, the existing environmental inequalities remain unacknowledged 
and disregarded, the injustice against the EU periphery is effectively en-
trenched and perpetuated; (vii) if EU environmental regulation continues 
with ‘business as usual’ and is not adapted to address the environmental 
inequalities between the EU centre and periphery, the injustice against 
the latter is effectively legitimised through it.
5 Environmental injustice and EU legal (constitutional) formalism 
Those who accept the existence of environmental injustice in the 
EU as proposed here might not only reject that the EU legal and political 
structures contribute to that injustice in any way; they could also argue 
that the Union has set up a framework that progressively decreases any 
sort of inequalities (including environmental ones) between the Member 
States. For instance, Steger holds that
The European Union has a foundation from which to encourage and 
support environmental justice. […] [O]f the multiple streams linking 
human rights and the environment, the movement for environmental 
justice has fi nally come to the European Union.151
I, on the other hand, will claim in this section that the EU frame-
work fails to properly ensure environmental justice in both respects: in 
general, that is, within its Member States individually, or in the context 
that I have set out in this paper. Note that this sort of negative argument 
(‘what X does not do’) might be unsatisfactory for some. They might ex-
pect the paper to provide a positive (perhaps empirical) argument about 
the role and contribution of EU (environmental) law, or of the Member 
States of the EU centre perhaps, in entrenching and perpetuating the 
identifi ed injustice (‘what X does’); or to offer fast-track, feasible solutions 
for adapting the EU framework to address environmental injustice be-
tween the EU centre and periphery and deliver substantive equality in 
this matter (‘what X should do, and how’). However, not providing such 
an account should not be taken as proof of the inappropriateness of my 
150  See Galalis (n 2).
151  Steger (n 32) 18-19.
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original argument just reiterated above. To dismiss my argument and 
counter it with this objection is logically unsustainable: the soundness 
or convincingness of the criticism of the present system cannot depend 
on its (in)ability to build a case for an alternative.
First I want to look at the EU constitutional and policy framework.
A ‘constitutional charter’152 of the EU − the Union’s founding Trea-
ties and its Charter of Fundamental Rights153 − does not contain the 
term ‘environmental justice’. It does mention the word ‘environment’ 
around thirty times (the word ‘justice’ appears several times more). The 
most important Treaty provisions concern EU environmental law and 
policymaking.154 Its key policy documents, such as the EU’s current (sev-
enth) Environment Action Programme, likewise seem to be silent on any 
notion of environmental justice.155
However, one may go further than a mere word search and add that 
‘the fact that the term environmental justice is not (yet) well-known in 
Europe does not necessarily mean that the European environmental 
policy is unjust’.156 So, it is necessary to look more carefully into other 
EU constitutional provisions and principles. Here are the most relevant 
ones.
Articles 11 TFEU mandates the EU authorities to integrate ‘[e]nvi-
ronmental protection requirements […] into the defi nition and implemen-
tation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a view 
to promoting sustainable development’. Similarly, Article 37 of the EU 
152  Referred to in this way for the fi rst time in Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v 
European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para 23.
153  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [2012] OJ C326/13; Con-
solidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2012] 
OJ C326/47; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391.
154  The EU environmental regulation encompasses all sorts of issues: ‘agriculture, air, 
chemicals, circular economy, cities, climate change, energy, industry, land and soil, marine 
and coastal environment, nature and biodiversity, noise, research and innovation, trans-
port, waste, water’. See Commission, ‘Energy, Climate change, Environment’, available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climate-change-environment_en> accessed 31 October 
2019. At the same time, the EU prides itself on having ensured for its citizens ‘some of 
the world’s highest environmental standards’. See Offi cial website of the European Union, 
Environment, available at <https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/environment_en> 
accessed 31 October 2019: (‘EU citizens benefi t from some of the highest environmental 
standards in the world’. […] ‘The EU has some of the world’s highest environmental stan-
dards, developed over decades’).
155  Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 No-
vember 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, 
within the limits of our planet’ [2013] OJ L354/171. 
156  Bernard Vanheusden, ‘Relevance of Environmental Justice for the Legal Framework in 
the European Union’ (2010) 7(2) Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 
165.
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Charter (entitled ‘Environmental Protection’) states that ‘[a] high level of 
environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the en-
vironment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured 
in accordance with the principle of sustainable development’. Thus, for 
instance, Article 194 regulating the establishment and functioning of 
the EU energy market emphasises ‘the need to preserve and improve the 
environment’.
Furthermore, Articles 191 and 192 TFEU enumerate principles and 
objectives of the EU environmental policy: (i) sustainable development, 
also defi ned in Article 3 TEU to include the EU’s commitment to a ‘high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’; (ii) 
the precautionary principle; (iii) the preventive principle; (iv) the principle of 
rectifi cation at source; and (v) the polluter pays principle.
Especially important for the further discussion is the reference to 
 the diversity of environmental circumstances and levels of economic de-
velopment of different EU’s regions, which merits reproduction in full:
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of 
the Union. […] In preparing its policy on the environment, the Union shall 
take account of: available scientifi c and technical data, environmental 
conditions in the various regions of the Union, the potential benefi ts and 
costs of action or lack of action, the economic and social development 
of the Union as a whole and the balanced development of its regions.157
And further:
Without prejudice to the principle that the polluter should pay, if a meas-
ure […] involves costs deemed disproportionate for the public authorities 
of a Member State, such measure shall lay down appropriate provisions 
in the form of: temporary derogations, and/or fi nancial support from the 
Cohesion Fund […].158
This, as I will argue later, seems to leave the only possibility for rec-
tifying gaps between the EU centre and periphery through redistributive 
(environmental) policies. As Steger and Filcak wrote a decade ago:
The concept of economic and social cohesion […] is refl ected in the 
budget: structural policy is the second most heavily funded sector in 
157  Article 191(2)(3) TFEU (emphasis added).
158  Article 192(5) TFEU (emphasis added). Recent numbers show that through the EU co-
hesion policy, ten Member States of the periphery have received EUR 365.2 billion since the 
fi rst and the biggest wave of the eastern enlargement in 2004. See Commission, ‘Growing 
Together: EU support to Member States that joined in 2004’ (30 April 2019) available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/growing-together-eu-support-member-
states-joined-2004_en> accessed 31 October 2019.
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the Union after the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There is a broad 
consensus on the need for greater cohesion. Cohesion policy is the way 
the European Union expresses solidarity and bears witness to the exist-
ence in the [Union] of a special model of development. Regional disparities 
have been increasing as a result of […] enlargements, and it will be essen-
tial to help those regions in most need. Otherwise the Union may face the 
creation of new walls between prosperous and marginalized regions and 
the environmental consequences.159
The environmental provisions and principles listed above have been 
operationalised in a range of EU secondary legal acts, almost exclusively 
in directives, with only a few regulations.160 As a preliminary matter, to 
me it seems that there is no explicit doctrinal or textual ground for deriv-
ing environmental justice as understood in US scholarship (and present-
ed in this paper) from the existing EU principles (although it could be 
argued that this is not a necessary requirement, since, illustratively, the 
US Constitution does not incorporate a similar textual reference, where-
as US legal doctrine and administrative practices lend more support to 
the notion of environmental justice). In any event, highly imaginative, 
and certainly not uncontroversial, interpretative moves would be neces-
sary as I propose later in this section. But fi rst, a word on the shortcom-
ings of the constitutional framework currently in place.
First of all, the existing constitutional environmental principles 
might complement environmental justice in the EU under some circum-
stances, but under others they might directly confl ict with it.161 As Ole 
Pedersen convincingly demonstrates (hence I draw on his account close-
ly in what follows), for instance,  the precautionary principle could fail 
the expectations of substantive environmental justice primarily due to 
its focus on risk assessment and risk management tools that privilege 
159  Tamara Steger and Richard Filcak, ‘Articulating the Basis for Promoting Environmental 
Justice in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2008) 1(1) Environmental Justice 52 (emphasis 
added).
160  See the repository of relevant EU environmental legislative and policy documents: Euro-
pean Environment Agency, ‘Environmental Policy Document Catalogue’, available at <www.
eea.europa.eu/policy-documents> accessed 2 November 2019. See also Jasmina Kostelac 
Bjegovic, ‘Handbook on the Implementation of EU Environmental Legislation’ (Publications 
Offi ce of the EU 2016) available at <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publica-
tion/2b832b9d-9aea-11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1> accessed 2 November 2019.
161  Ole W Pedersen, ‘Environmental Principles and Environmental Justice’ (2010) 12(1) 
Environmental Law Review 26: ‘[A] comparison [of environmental principles] with environ-
mental justice gives rise to confl icts as well as conformity’. The same argument would hold 
for the US regulatory context too, as witnessed by references to the US scholarship in the 
following part. Unfortunately, in order not to exceed the purpose and limits of the present 
paper, I cannot provide a comprehensive comparison of the US-EU regulatory solutions 
(and similar problems they both suffer from) on this matter, although I share the anony-
mous reviewer’s view that such comparison would indeed be useful.
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quantifi able (economic, monetary) and disregard non-quantifi able (so-
cial, cultural) factors.162 For this reason, Pedersen continues, application 
of the precautionary principle ‘in some instances, lead[s] to confrontation 
with ideas of public participation, emphasis on social justice, and popu-
lar epidemiology − all ideas that are central to environmental justice’.163
For the European context more specifi cally, in their seminal study 
Pye and others wrote that:
[The impact assessment] approach [has been criticised because], in 
practice, the focus is principally on economic aspects, while non-econom-
ic aspects are usually framed in an economic way (e.g. social issues are 
typically reduced to employment considerations). Additionally, [impact 
assessments] on environmental policy proposals did not cover social as-
pects well, while ‘non’ environmental policy proposals tended not to 
cover environmental aspects well.164
Pedersen further argues that the principle of prevention likewise 
might fail environmental justice. The reasons include the dependence 
of preventive action on cost-benefi t analysis, the latter being driven by 
market logic and inherently oriented toward preserving the status quo.165 
In other words: 
162  ibid, 35. Also, Ken Sexton, ‘Socioeconomic and Racial Disparities in Environmental 
Health: Is Risk Assessment Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?’ (2000) 6(4) Human 
and Ecological Risk Assessment 571: ‘Interpreting risk assessment to include only “hard” 
quantifi able (or quantifi ed) factors, and disregarding or marginalizing “soft” nonquantifi able 
(or not quantifi ed) variables, has tended historically to preclude considerations of pertinent 
issues, such as social class, ethnicity, race, and culture’ (emphasis added). A similar critique 
of impact assessment tools has been offered in Europe. For a general critique of the precau-
tionary principle and its incoherence and impracticality, see Cass R Sunstein, Laws of Fear: 
Beyond the Precautionary Principle (CUP 2005).
163  Pedersen (n 161) 35. Pedersen then acknowledges that ‘[o]n the other hand, the part 
of the precautionary principle that emphasises a change in the burden of proof, notwith-
standing the legal ambiguity of such assertions, can form part of the environmental justice 
advocate’s toolkit’.
164  Pye and others (n 12) 32-33 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
165  Pedersen (n 161) 37: ‘[T]he principle carries with it a reliance on cost-benefi t analysis. 
This is witnessed where the principle is qualifi ed, as it often is, by reference to a particu-
lar harm being either “serious” or “signifi cant” before action is taken. In such cases, the 
authority deciding whether preventive action is needed will have to weigh the probability 
of damage against the possible environmental, health and socio-economic benefi ts and 
costs. Often such use of cost-benefi t analysis, and its reliance on willingness to pay princi-
ples, is considered to be at odds with environmental justice arguments’ (footnotes omitted). 
See also Douglas A Kysar, ‘Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive 
Rationality’ (2004) 31 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 555 (noting the 
scepticism of environmentalists who claim that cost-benefi t analysis makes environmental 
damage get lost in attempts to reduce it to monetary terms, and is thus inherently orient-
ed toward the status quo). On the other hand, Pedersen (n 161) notes that ‘cost-benefi t 
analysis can actually work in favour of an environmental justice argument’, echoing Cass 
Sunstein’s argument that ‘it is possible to adjust any cost-benefi t analysis so that it takes 
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What worries environmental justice advocates about cost-benefi t anal-
ysis and the economic way of thinking is that it seems to give license to 
the tyrannization of minorities, as long as there is an increase in wealth. 
Thus, cost-benefi t analysis and other economic instruments seem to open 
the door to the oppression of poor minorities (both in the ethnic and the 
political sense) for the benefi t of the rich.166
Similarly, the polluter pays principle is implemented fi rst and fore-
most with a market-focused rationale, most often to the disadvantage of 
the most-deprived groups and individuals.167
Finally, the principle of sustainable development is frequently at odds 
with environmental justice given that it places social equity on an equal 
footing with economic development and environmental protection. It has 
thus 
been argued that the broad focus on environmentally friendly solutions 
in the name of sustainable development − for instance, in the produc-
tion of housing and commodities − will lead to situations where sus-
tainability only reinforces already existing patterns of social inconsist-
encies.168
Therefore, for some authors the concepts of sustainable development 
and environmental justice are essentially antithetical.169
Moreover, other environmental mechanisms implemented through 
the EU secondary law that put into concrete form the above-mentioned 
environmental principles, such as the landmark emissions trading 
scheme, are often at odds with environmental justice. ‘Cap-and-trade’ 
into account distributive problems’ 38. See the works of Cass Sunstein that Pedersen ref-
erences in his article: ‘Lives, Life-years, and Willingness to Pay’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law 
Review 205; ‘The Arithmetic of Arsenic’ (2002) 90 Georgetown Law Journal 2255; ‘Selective 
Fatalism’ (1998) 27(2) Journal of Legal Studies 799. 
166  Shi-ling Hsu, ‘On the Role of Cost-benefi t Analysis in Environmental Law: A Book Re-
view of Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling’s Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Every-
thing and the Value of Nothing’ (2005) 35(1) Environmental Law 171, as quoted in Pedersen 
(n 161) 37 (emphasis added).
167  Pedersen (n 161) 42: ‘The main problems with the polluter pays principle, from an 
environmental justice point of view, are the principle’s focus on free-market ideals, which 
on an ideological level goes against certain aspects of environmental justice, and the ways 
in which the principle is best implemented − through taxes which have the potential to hit 
the already hard-done-by populations the hardest’. ‘However’, Pedersen adds, ‘at the same 
time, the principle can be utilised to achieve central environmental justice goals − mainly 
of a fairer distribution of harms and costs from polluting activities, where it operates as a 
rule of liability’.
168  ibid, 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
169  JB Ruhl, ‘The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: 
Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Confl ict’ (1999) 9(2) Duke Environmental Law and 
Policy Forum 161.
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schemes of this kind are usually a point of contention between envi-
ronmentalists and environmental justice movements, since they relegate 
emissions regulation to the market and disregard the social conditions 
of those suffering immediately from those emissions.170
In sum, it remains far from obvious that the existing environmen-
tal principles are capable of guaranteeing environmental justice to EU 
citizens in general, let alone in the context of the EU centre-periphery 
divide. At best, these principles seem to be fi t to ‘cover only a limited part 
of the notion of environmental justice’.171
Where all this leads is the only option that I have earlier identifi ed 
as having the potential to address gaps between the EU centre and pe-
riphery through environmental redistributive policies, and that is the 
Treaty reference to environmental diversity and the unequal econom-
ic development of the EU regions. As it stands, it only introduces the 
procedural obligation (of questionable legal force) to ‘take into account 
the diversity of environmental conditions in the various regions of the 
Union’. Notably, it fails to require − or to impose a ‘hard’ mandate to 
reach and achieve − substantively just outcomes in environmental mat-
ters in the disadvantaged parts of the EU. In my view, arguably the only 
way to bridge the environmental centre-periphery gap would be through 
the conceptualisation of the Treaties’ provisions (Articles 191 and 192 
TFEU) in explicit (and substantive) environmental justice terms, in or-
der to effectuate even stronger redistributive policies in favour of the EU 
periphery. This reading is, moreover, reinforced by the listing in Article 
3 TEU of the fundamental objectives of the EU, where (in paragraph 3), 
right next to the Union’s establishment of the internal market and ‘work 
for the sustainable development of Europe based on […] a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’, one fi nds 
‘promot[ion] of social justice’ and of ‘economic, social and territorial co-
hesion, and solidarity among Member States’.172 
170  Eli Keenea, ‘Resources for Relocation: In Search of a Coherent Federal Policy on Reset-
tling Climate-Vulnerable Communities’ (2018) 48 Texas Environmental Law Journal 141: 
‘Some environmental justice groups have, for example, long objected to cap-and-trade pol-
icies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the reasoning that these policies 
are likely to promote the continued operation of facilities emitting conventional pollutants 
primarily in poor and minority communities’. See also Lilly N Chinn, ‘Can the Market Be 
Fair and Effi cient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading’ (1999) 26(1) 
Ecology Law Quarterly 80; Richard T Drury, Michael E Belliveau, Scott J Kuhn and Shipra 
Bansal, ‘Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in 
Air Quality Policy’ (1999) 9(2) Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 231.
171  Vanheusden (n 156) 167.
172  I thank the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to the possibility of reading 
Articles 191-192 TFEU and Article 3 TEU ‘in conjunction’ to buttress the argument in 
question.
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The Treaties’ environmental provisions in question should thus 
be operationalised as requiring differential treatment between the two 
groups of countries: although formally equal, Member States of the EU 
centre and periphery are substantively unequal in environmental mat-
ters, as I have previously shown. The root of the problem might be traced 
back to the 1990s: post-communist countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe were categorised in international environmental regimes (for ex-
ample, the UNFCCC) as ‘developed countries’. Although they did not fi t 
the category of ‘developing countries’ either, it was unrealistic that just 
by placing them in an artifi cially constructed category of economically 
‘developed countries’ they immediately matched the level of development 
or the historical environmental burden of Western European states. As 
a result, in Gonzalez’s words, ‘[g]iven the economic disparities among 
states, formal equality [is likely to] exacerbate poverty and inequality’.173
Nowadays, insisting formalistically on these randomly created, yet 
‘reifi ed’, categories prevents differentiation between the differently situat-
ed (in environmental matters) countries of the EU centre and periphery. 
What could be introduced in EU environmental law to ensure substan-
tive equality between the two groups of countries would follow the logic 
of asymmetric equality − something akin to the international law princi-
ples of ‘special or differential treatment’,174 such as ‘common but differen-
tiated responsibilities’ (CBDR).175 This approach would demand EU deci-
sion-making processes to acknowledge the EU centre’s disproportionate 
− historical and contemporary − contribution to environmental degra-
dation, its superior capacities and resources (fi nancial and technical) to 
address environmental problems, and the EU periphery’s economic and 
ecological vulnerability (in comparison to the EU centre).176
173  Gonzalez (n 22) 88 (emphasis added).
174  ibid, 87-88: ‘One important tool to mitigate North-South inequality is differential treat-
ment in international law. Norms of differential treatment in favour of Southern countries 
are designed to redress historic inequities, and have been utilised in both international 
economic law and international environmental law. While differential treatment has been 
on the wane in international economic law since the early 1990s, it has been on the rise in 
international environmental law. […] [T]he principles that have arisen to promote differen-
tial treatment [are]: (1) special and differential treatment in international trade law; and (2) 
common but differentiated responsibility in international environmental law. […] Differen-
tial treatment seeks to narrow the gap between the colonisers and the formerly colonised by 
providing more advantageous treatment to the latter’ (footnotes omitted).
175  Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (OUP 
2006).
176  Following the approach proposed by Gonzalez (n 22) 90-91: ‘States differ in terms of 
their contribution to global environmental degradation, their vulnerability to environmental 
harm, and their capacity to address environmental problems. Northern proposals to protect 
the global environment without taking these differences into account have sparked scepti-
cism in the global South. Indeed, Northern environmentalism was initially regarded as yet 
another effort to “kick away the ladder” and perpetuate Southern poverty by depriving the 
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I expect this proposal to be regarded as radical or illusory. The an-
swers that I anticipate might include some of the following.
One may immediately defend the current Treaty procedural require-
ment (‘take into account’) and regard any kind of substantive require-
ment for environmental justice as unnecessary with the following argu-
ment: EU environmental constitutional principles in synergy with just 
decision-making procedures established by the EU Treaties must render 
substantively just outcomes in environmental matters. This resembles 
the Rawlsian idea of a just constitution agreed upon by the social contrac-
tors, which establishes just procedures, whose operation ensures that the 
delivered substantive outcomes will be equally just. However, this account 
begs the question: what do the EU Treaties and the EU’s established pro-
cedures refl ect in terms of values and ideology? As argued by European 
CLS scholars, these values are dominantly market-centred and favour 
Member States of the EU centre. Moreover, legal rules and procedures 
refl ect the balance of power existing at the moment of their adoption; 
they are, in a way, ‘frozen politics’ of the constitutional moment.177 For 
this reason, the entire environmental framework will most likely refl ect 
the interests of the EU centre which dominated the creation of these 
principles, rules and procedures.
global South of the polluting technologies that the North had used to industrialise. […] The 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility fi nds use in international environmen-
tal law to impose asymmetrical obligations on the North and the South in light of: (1) the 
North’s disproportionate contribution to global environmental degradation; (2) the North’s 
superior fi nancial and technical resources; and (3) the South’s economic and ecological 
vulnerability’ (footnotes omitted). Something along these lines was seemingly attempted 
with the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, but with an uncertain outcome. See Johan Eyck-
mans, Jan Cornillie and Denise Van Regemorter, ‘Effi ciency and Equity in the EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement’ (2002) KU Leuven, Centre for Economic Studies Energy, Transport & 
Environment, Working Paper Series No. 2000-02 28: ‘[Having] investigated the EU Burden 
Sharing Agreement on carbon emission abatement that implements the EU’s Kyoto com-
mitment to reduce its greenhouse emissions by 8% compared to 1990 emissions by the 
compliance period 2008-2010 […] [which, it was argued,] reconciles both cost effi ciency and 
equity concerns […] we have shown that even if one does not care about distributive justice, 
th[e] differentiation of abatement obligations does not go far enough. Most of the richer EU 
member countries should abate more, many poorer member states less (or should get an 
even more generous allowance)’; but see Per-Olov Marklunda and Eva Samakovlis, ‘What 
Is Driving the EU Burden-sharing Agreement: Effi ciency or Equity?’ (2007) 85(2) Journal 
of Environmental Management 317 (arguing that both effi ciency and equity featured prom-
inently in reaching the agreement on the distribution of reduction targets for greenhouse 
gasses emissions between the Member States). See also Commission, ‘Climate Action. Effort 
Sharing 2021-2030: Targets and Flexibilities’, available at <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/effort/regulation_en> accessed 1 November 2019. I am grateful to the anonymous 
reviewer for pointing this issue out to me.
177  Perišin (n 39) 165: ‘Legal rules and their application are a consequence of a balance of 
power at a particular moment. They are “frozen politics”. Legal rules are a snapshot of polit-
ical power and political will at the moment of their adoption’ (footnotes omitted).
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Here, another objection may be that all EU Member States, includ-
ing the peripheral ones, have fully consented to every aspect of EU law 
when expressing their intention to join the Union, in accordance with 
their respective constitutional rules. The response to this would be to 
look into the conditions of that consent and ask under what circum-
stances the EU periphery joined? First, these countries did not join the 
Union as equals to the countries of the EU centre. Most of the EU rules 
and procedures were imposed on them through the process of member-
ship negotiations and strict conditionality that had to be complied with. 
The exchange between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States in that respect 
was not free and mutual but unequal and one-sided.178 As such, the 
values and interests of the new members were not refl ected in the con-
stitutional setup that emerged following the enlargement. Therefore, not 
only were the starting positions in the EU unequal, but the established 
constitutional setup might further deepen the existing differences and 
inequalities. As Perišin and Koplewicz note, the centre-periphery gap ‘is 
not just a consequence of the different starting positions at the moment 
of enlargement, but […] EU law can actually accentuate the differences 
between Member States’.179
A further objection might continue as follows: if the system is so 
unjust, why do they (the peripheral states) not leave? If they remain, 
are they not repeatedly consenting to the constitutional framework and 
thus confi rming its justness? This view simplifi es the voluntariness 
of remaining in the EU and not objecting to the existing rules: if one 
of the most powerful countries of the EU centre (the UK) is currently 
facing enormous diffi culties in implementing its withdrawal from the 
Union, how easy would it be for some peripheral states to do so? In this 
context, invoking the concept of consent would serve to legitimise the 
established hierarchies of power, the dominance of the rule-makers 
over the ruled (and possibly the latter’s exploitation). Let us remind 
ourselves here of the Gramscian view that ‘hegemony work[s] in many 
ways to induce the oppressed to accept or “consent” to their own ex-
ploitation and daily misery’.180
By extension, I submit the same would apply to environmental prin-
ciples and procedures. There, we have unequal input between the centre 
and periphery; hence, the output will be unequal too. A gap between 
the environmental values and interests of the EU core and periphery is 
178  Siniša Rodin, ‘Discourse and Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Cul-
ture’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1.
179  Perišin and Koplewicz (n 21) XIV (referencing the works of Daniela Caruso and Damjan 
Kukovec) (footnotes omitted).
180  Gottlieb, Bix, Lytton and West (n 16) 632.
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increasingly becoming apparent.181 So, simply by having formally just 
principles and procedures in the EU, without explicitly inserting sub-
stantive requirements for environmental justice, does not ensure that 
environmental justice will be delivered for every Member State equal-
ly. The insuffi ciency of ‘the procedural approach only’ has already been 
recognised in the USA.182 To expect otherwise is to hold strongly to the 
formalist understanding of equality, law and justice, formalism which 
dominates the European legal culture.183 (Recall that earlier I have simi-
larly criticised the formalistic approach in the procedural and corrective 
dimensions of environmental justice in the EU.) This is the classic ap-
proach of legal liberalism, its ‘utopian moment’: pretending that there is 
an initial state of equality, and making rules as if there was indeed such 
a state, in order for those rules to lead there, that is, to a state of genuine 
substantive equality.184
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have adopted a different analytical approach from 
what is usually attempted in European legal scholarship: analysing en-
vironmental injustices within individual states in Europe or observing 
Europe’s role internationally, as part of the global North, in environmen-
tal injustices against developing countries. Instead, I have framed the 
discussion about environmental justice in the EU in terms of the divide 
between its centre (Member States of Western and Northern Europe) and 
periphery (Member States of Central and Eastern Europe). I have identi-
fi ed distributive, procedural and corrective injustices that make the EU 
periphery, although less responsible for historical and contemporary en-
vironmental harms in Europe, bear greater environmental burden than 
the EU centre, in addition to having less infl uence over environmental 
decision-making. I have used ideas that have already emerged (most-
181  Perhaps most notable, at least recently, is the bloc’s divide on coming up with a climate 
change strategy for the Paris Agreement Conference of Parties in 2018. See Jean Chemnick, 
‘UN Talks Deliver “Fragile Balance” on Paris rules’ (Environment & Energy News, 17 De-
cember 2018) available at <www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060109775> accessed 
1 November 2019.
182  Lynn (n 1) 240: ‘Procedural laws cannot meet environmental justice goals of equal con-
cern and respect’.
183  Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem, ‘Reflections on European Legal Formalism’ in Tamara 
Perišin and Siniša Rodin (eds), The Transformation or Reconstitution of Europe. The Critical 
Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of the Courts in the European Union (Hart Publishing 
2018) 203.
184  Remarks by Professor Catharine A MacKinnon during a lecture at the University of 
Michigan Law School (April 2019). See also MacKinnon (n 138) 45: ‘Because a fundamental 
dynamic of the European Union revolves around the handling of differences among Member 
States, adjudication of equality issues on a [Union] level often confronts cultural assump-
tions and raises methodological as well as substantive equality issues’ (emphasis added).
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ly) in US scholarship, in the context of environmental justice, compar-
ative constitutionalism and federalism studies, and, more generally, in 
the critical analysis of the (re)distributive effects of law and the identity 
critique of law. Finally, I have refl ected on some possible avenues for 
integrating environmental justice concerns into the EU legal and institu-
tional framework in order to better address the centre-periphery gap and 
mitigate existing regional inequalities. Here, I want to offer a few more 
general thoughts about this.
First, it is not immediately obvious for what reason and how − that 
is, through which instruments and at which levels of governance − to 
modify laws and policies after environmental injustice in the EU has 
been identifi ed at this level.185 Due to subsidiarity issues and the divi-
sion of competences between the EU and the Member States, the Union 
authorities can only address the supranational (and not purely national) 
instances of environmental injustice.186 So, some imaginative rethinking 
will be inevitable. As Pedersen observes, ‘environmental justice as a con-
cept provides a framework for the probing of established environmental 
law and policy norms and concepts’.187
For this to happen, purely formal amendments of relevant laws and 
strategies would plainly be inappropriate on their own.188 A conceptual 
move from sustainable development towards differential treatment of the 
185  Paul Mohai, David Pellow and J Timmons Roberts, ‘Environmental Justice’ (2009) 34 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 407: ‘[The] reason environmental justice 
studies are controversial is that it is not immediately obvious what should be done after 
an injustice has been documented: Addressing environmental injustice with public policy 
could involve complex and expensive local, national, or perhaps even global interventions’. 
Also, in the EU context, Perišin and Koplewicz (n 21) XVII: ‘Regardless of whether any 
inequality was caused or aggravated by the EU or whether it was caused by other develop-
ments, the question remains about what the EU should be doing to correct it’.
186  Pye and others (n 12) 32: ‘When discussing the strategic policies and processes at the 
EU level, it is important to bear in mind the competencies and role of the European Com-
mission with respect to its Member States. These are governed by [EU] treaty and − amongst 
others − the principle of subsidiarity. From the perspective of the relationship between the 
EU and its Member States, therefore, decisions should be taken at the Member State level, 
unless EU level action is more appropriate. The role of the Commission is set out in the 
Treaty and varies between policy areas. For example, while a large proportion of Member 
States environmental policies have their origins in EU environmental legislation, most as-
pects of social policy remain the competence of Member States. Hence, the EU has only lim-
ited powers in the fi eld of social policies, including those aimed at reducing social exclusion. 
This is refl ected in the fact that the measures to take forward the social exclusion agenda 
focus on coordination of Member State approaches, whereas action on the environment 
often takes the form of legislation’ (footnotes omitted).
187  Pedersen (n 161) 49.
188  Steger and Filcak (n 159) 52: ‘[T]he formal declaration of legal principles is only one 
step in a series of steps for addressing the roots and effects of the unequal distribution of 
adverse environmental impacts’. For some examples of the possible policy and legal amend-
ments (‘preambulatory and/or substantive’), see Steger (n 32) 52.
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EU centre and periphery, similar to what we have in international law, 
would be warranted (as I have argued in the previous section). More 
specifi cally, some kind of tools for assessing the distributional impacts 
of the EU environmental regulations and policies between different Mem-
ber States would also be necessary, but not suffi cient in themselves.189 
Regarding the institutional actors, the solution should probably not be 
looked for on the Luxembourg benches but rather in the political pro-
cess, since the Court of Justice − for many European legal scholars, a 
traditional ‘last resort’ protector of rights − champions, as we have seen, 
restrictive and regressive interpretations in matters bordering environ-
mental justice.
On the other hand, the law might not offer the answer at all. Even 
worse − it might colonise the struggle for environmental justice.190 If so, 
what could be left for the EU’s ‘integration through law’ approach?191 
Radical solutions, such as ‘a bold rethinking of the dominant economic 
paradigm’192 would seem counterintuitive and antithetical to the raison 
d’être of the EU market-centred integration project. This would be off the 
189  Pye and others (n 12) 33: ‘[T]he European Commission and national, or regional ad-
ministrations as appropriate, should develop guidance and other tools, as necessary, on 
assessing distributional impacts (e.g. through Equality Impact Assessments), and require 
this to be followed if there is the potential that a proposed policy might have adverse im-
pacts on vulnerable groups’.
190  For a powerful, critical assessment of the (in)compatibility between (legal) environ-
mentalists and environmental justice movements in the USA that in many ways still feels 
relevant today, and whose gist might equally be applied to the supranational context, see 
Luke W Cole, ‘Foreword: A Jeremiad on Environmental Justice and the Law’ (1995) 14 
Stanford Environmental Law Journal xiii-xv: ‘[T]he fi eld of environmental justice is being 
colonized by lawyers and legal groups. […] When the legal groups get hold of the concept 
of environmental justice, they redefi ne it to fi t their focus and orientation, although they 
are in direct opposition to the essence of environmental justice. The “answer” to environ-
mental racism becomes laws and litigation, rather than community empowerment in local 
decisionmaking. […] What began as a vibrant community movement gets redefi ned as 
just another issue for which we need legislation or a new legal strategy. Such redefi nition, 
which reinforces the existing social/political hierarchy by favoring legal “expertise” over 
community action, is completely at odds with the environmental justice movement. […] 
The colonization of the movement by legal groups dilutes the movement’s premises, taking 
the power of environmental justice as a potentially transformative social movement and 
turning it into “just another” issue among the many on which the legal groups are work-
ing. In a very real way, the legal groups are re-creating one of the roots of environmental 
injustice: the making of decisions by people not affected by those decisions. Thus, on both 
the theoretical and practical levels, the entrance of legal groups into the environmental 
justice fi eld is in many ways a detriment to the movement, blunting its ideological edge 
and diverting its limited resources’.
191  Loïc Azoulai, ‘“Integration through Law” and Us’ (2016) 14(2) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 449.
192  Gonzalez (n 22) 85: ‘[E]nvironmental justice calls for a bold rethinking of the dominant 
economic paradigm so as to promote economic and social development while respecting the 
planet’s biophysical limits’.
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table, I believe. Nevertheless, some things could perhaps be attempted 
from within the system: it seems that there is still some room for the 
better integration of substantive environmental justice principles and 
objectives in both social and environmental policies and regulations in 
the EU.193
Currently, it remains highly questionable whether the existing envi-
ronmental framework in the EU is capable of delivering the two-pronged 
objective: safeguarding the environment (in Europe and globally) and 
the most vulnerable communities (nationally, regionally, globally) that 
suffer from environmental degradation.194 Or whether diverging nation-
al environmental and social traditions in Europe could ever converge 
into a genuine EU environmental justice approach.195 Whether a genuine 
cross-policy integration of environmental justice in the EU would ever 
be politically feasible is another issue: it would inevitably necessitate big 
redistributive measures that would themselves create new winners and 
losers.196 This is not a purely technocratic call, but an ideological and 
193  Pye and others (n 12) made the following recommendations (among others): ‘The con-
cept of environmental justice should be adopted as a guiding principle for policy develop-
ment at the European level and across all Member States as a means of addressing social 
concerns within environmental policy. […] Environmental inequalities should be considered 
in the design and implementation of policy through the impact assessment process at the 
European, national and local levels’ (v). They further argued that ‘[i]t is important that the 
interlinkages and interactions between environmental and social policy are recognised in 
order to avoid confl ict between policy objectives and to contribute to the development of 
better and mutually reinforcing policies for both policy areas. These policy areas are deep-
ly interlinked; environmental policy impacts on society in different ways while social fac-
tors affect environmental quality, for example through patterns of consumption. Therefore, 
there is a need for policy makers to take an integrated approach, recognising where the 
policy areas interface, and considering policy design and implementation that is mutually 
advantageous’ (ii). Steger (n 32) 51, added that ‘[s]trengthening EU laws to promote envi-
ronmental justice could include making linkages between EU anti-discrimination and EU 
environmental law and mainstreaming environmental justice themes and considerations 
into all EU policies (social, development, health sectors, etc.) and especially environmen-
tal laws’. Laurent (n 13) 1849, similarly remarked that ‘environmental policies should be 
embedded in and not artifi cially isolated from social policies, so that true “social-ecological 
policies” can be designed and implemented and become building blocks of a fairer European 
welfare state’.
194  Chaitanya Motupalli, ‘Intergenerational Justice, Environmental Law, and Restorative 
Justice’ (2018) 8(2) Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 360: ‘Although 
it is a remarkable achievement, we have seen that existing environmental law has consid-
erable limitations, and the hope of using it to fi x environmental problems is rather slim’.
195  Laurent (n 13) 1849: ‘[…] the possibility to conceive not only a European approach, 
distinct from the US approach, but an integrated or even harmonized European approach 
and possibly a European Union approach to environmental justice, bringing together the 
different (young) national traditions in this domain of public action. The problem here is the 
fragmented nature of those national traditions’ (footnotes omitted).
196  Motupalli (n 194) 340: ‘[E]nvironmental law […] has a “tremendous redistributive 
thrust”. By statutory terms, regulations, and enforcement, environmental law imposes 
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value-laden one − politically perhaps the hardest call of all. As Walker 
warns, 
environmental decision making is not just a technocratic process, there 
is an inevitable normative politics involved. Incorporating distributional 
analysis of winners and losers, benefi ts and burdens, might make a key 
part of this normative politics more explicit, but in so doing the result 
may be to emphasise difference and disagreement rather than enable 
negotiation and consensus building.197
In the context of the EU centre-periphery divide, the traditional EU 
technocratic outlook in environmental decision-making would need to 
recognise the normative, political part to it.198 This would come with an 
even greater redistribution of wealth from the EU centre to its periphery. 
However, it seems highly unlikely that in the current state of EU inte-
gration anything like this would be an acceptable alternative. It would 
demand unprecedented solidarity of the citizenry in Member States of 
the centre with their counterparts in the EU periphery; the former’s ac-
ceptance to lose in order for the latter to gain. To paraphrase Žižek, 
a contemporary critical philosopher (originally from the EU periphery): 
‘Redistribution [to achieve environmental justice] hurts’.199 Contrary to 
what a liberal-centrist, status quo-preserving position would have, there 
costs and benefi ts on various stakeholders, and in the process creates winners and losers’ 
(footnotes omitted).
197  Gordon Walker, ‘Environmental Justice, Impact Assessment and the Politics of Knowl-
edge: The Implications of Assessing the Social Distribution of Environmental Outcomes’ 
(2010) 30(5) Environmental Impact Assessment Review 317 (emphasis added).
198  This is precisely what CLS scholars urge for the law in general: that it can never be tech-
nocratic and objective but that it embodies important social and normative elements. So, 
when it is claimed that the law is neutral or technical, this usually obfuscates and conceals 
its biased background − the ordering of society, the political decision, or in Holt’s words − 
the ‘tilt’ in favour of the dominant ruling elite and its established interests. See Wythe Holt, 
‘Tilt’ (1984) 52(2) George Washington Law Review 280.
199  Žižekian ‘liberation hurts’ appears in the discussion of his The Fragile Absolute: Or, 
Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (Verso Books 2000) in ‘“Liberation Hurts”, 
An Interview with Slavoj Žižek by Eric Dean Rasmussen’ (Electronic Book Review, 7 Jan-
uary 2004) available at <https://electronicbookreview.com/essay/liberation-hurts-an-in-
terview-with-slavoj-zizek/> accessed 1 November 2019, where Žižek also says: ‘[L]iberation 
hurts. What I don’t buy from liberals is this idea of, as Robespierre would have put it, 
“revolution without revolution”, the idea that somehow, everything will change, but nobody 
will be really hurt. No, sorry, it hurts’. It should be mentioned that this idea of solidarity 
and (some) redistribution in favour of the EU periphery has recently been shyly entertained 
in the context of negotiations of the EU’s 2050 climate strategy, when the idea of ‘Energy 
Transition Fund/Just Transition Fund’ popped up. See Sam Morgan, ‘Climate Cash Cow: 
Where EU Countries Can Get Their Funding’ (EURACTIV, 18 June 2019) available at <www.
euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/climate-cash-cow-where-eu-countries-
can-get-their-funding/> accessed 1 November 2019; Sam Morgan, ‘The Curious Case of 
the Missing Fund’ (EURACTIV, 22 October 2019) available at <www.euractiv.com/section/
energy-environment/news/the-brief-the-curious-case-of-the-missing-fund/> accessed 1 
November 2019.
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is arguably no way of righting the (historical) wrongs without someone 
suffering (some) injustice in the process. 
So, given the contemporary political zeitgeist and the fragility of Eu-
ropean demoi-cracy,200 the ideal of EU nations being ‘united in diversity’ 
while approaching the ‘ever closer Union’ around the concept of environ-
mental justice, unfortunately, seems unattainable. How seriously, if at 
all, this acknowledgment would affect the future of European integration 
remains an open question.201
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201  Perišin and Koplewicz (n 21) XXII: ‘For the future of European integration, it is vital for 
the EU to address two questions. First, how much inequality can be attributed to the effects 
of law in the current set-up of the EU system (ie can Brussels or Luxembourg be blamed for 
it) or, instead, is inequality the result of different causes (eg globalisation, technical prog-
ress)? Second, what can the EU do to address inequalities resulting from EU integration or 
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